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ABSTRACT
Reconstruction, as viewed by historians, is usually 
divided into two distinct periods, "Presidential" and 
"Congressional," each controlled by a different branch of the 
United States Government.
This approach leaves one major question unanswered:
What of Grant, "the tanner boy," and Reconstruction? After 
all, President Ulysses S. Grant was elected to the office of 
President of the United States in 1868, and served in that 
capacity from March 4, 1869, until March 4, 1877, when 
Rutherford B. Hayes assumed office.
Grant: "The Tanner Bov" and Reconstruction answers this
question and determines why Grant has been deemed less 
important than Lincoln, Johnson, or Congress during this 
period. This thesis examines Grant's plans for 
reconstructing the Union, his success in implementing them, 
and his overall impact on Reconstruction. In evaluating 
these issues, primary attention has been placed upon Grant’s 
presidential presentations, especially his State of the Union 
addresses and proclamations.
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"Grant's postwar career was decidedly anticlimactic. To be 
sure he was elected as a Republican to two terms as president 
(1869-1877), but his administrations were marred by 
indecisive leadership, an inconsistent policy on southern 
Reconstruction, and massive corruption."
William L. Barneyi
"But the class next after us [1843] was destined to furnish 
the man who was to eclipse us all— to rise to the rank of 
general, an office made by Congress to honor his services, 
who became President of the United States, and for a second 
term; who received the salutations of all the powers of the 
world in his travels as a private citizen around the earth, 
of noble, generous heart, a lovable character, a valued 
friend,— Ulysses S. Grant."
James B. Longstreetz
1 William L. Barney, "Grant, Ulysses S.," Eric Foner and 
John A. Garraty, eds., The Reader's Companion To American 
History (Boston, 1991), 465-66.
2 James Longstreet, From Manassas To Appomatox (1895; 
Reprint, New York, 1994), 4.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
At approximately 4:15 a.m., April 12, 1861, the national 
ties between the northern and southern states of the United 
States of America were broken. As Mary Chestnut, a citizen 
of Charleston, South Carolina noted in her diary, "If [Major 
Robert] Anderson does not accept terms - at four - the orders 
are he shall be fired upon" and then "at half-past four, the 
heavy booming of cannon."i Thus, the Confederate forces 
initiated the American Civil War by opening fire on the 
Federal garrison at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, South 
Carolina and the American governmental system based on the 
Constitution of the United States of America failed to avert 
a costly civil war.
After two years and eight months of savage conflict, 
with demoralizing defeats at such places as Bull Run and 
Chancellorsville, frustrating draws at Shiloh and Antietam, 
and spectacular victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the 
Union forces seemed to be on the road to eventual victory.
As a result, President Abraham Lincoln took the first steps 
toward bringing about the reconstruction of the nation. On 
December 8, 1863, the President in a formal proclamation to
1 C . Vann Woodward, ed., Mary Chestnut's Civil War (New 
Haven, 1981), 46.
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the nation outlined the steps to be followed by any 
southerner who wished to reestablish his allegiance to the 
United States. Lincoln's program also provided the 
guidelines for the collective citizenry of any southern state 
desiring to return their state to the U n i o n . 2
His plan, which was met with extensive discussion both 
north and south of the Mason-Dixon line, initiated the first 
phase of Reconstruction known collectively by American 
historians as the period of "Presidential Reconstruction."
The issues which Lincoln, Congress and his three predecessors 
faced were extremely complex and seemed to defy resolution. 
They included such diverse problems as finding a just peace 
out of civil war, national unity out of sectional strife, 
equal civil rights out of slavery, equality of race out of 
discrimination, and free suffrage out of intimidation. From 
December 8, 1863, until his assassination on April 15, 1865, 
Lincoln attempted to both chart and implement the process of 
rebuilding the United States into a single free nation.
With Lincoln's death, Vice-President Andrew Johnson 
assumed that responsibility, and quickly set out to establish 
his own set of Reconstruction policies. His efforts met 
determined resistance in Congress, which sought to implement 
its own plans. This collision of ideas resulted in a period 
of bitter disagreements and recriminations which lasted until 
1867, when Congress defeated President Johnson's plans, 
programs, and ambitions.
2 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols., 
Washington, DC, 1896-1899), VI, 213.
In March 1867 Congress passed, over President Johnson's 
veto, The Reconstruction Acts of 1867, which sub-divided the 
southern states into five distinct military districts, each 
under the command of a single military officer. Under these 
acts the new military governor was to utilize the military 
forces at his disposal to protect the citizenry and property 
located within the district. This legislation also provided 
yet a third plan for rebuilding and readmitting the South 
into the Union. This new procedure signaled the beginning of 
Congressional Reconstruction, which ran its course from March 
of 1867 to the final days of 1877, when with the collapse of 
the few remaining Republican State governments in the South, 
the process ended.
Reconstruction then, as viewed by historians, is usually 
divided into two distinct periods controlled by two different 
branches of the United States government. The first period, 
defined as "Presidential Reconstruction," was controlled by 
Presidents Lincoln and Johnson from 1863 to approximately 
March 1867. The second period is identified as the time of 
"Congressional Reconstruction" from March 1867 to December 
1877.
This approach to the period leaves one major 
question unanswered: What of Grant, "the tanner boy," and
Reconstruction?3 After all, President Ulysses S. Grant was 
elected to the office of President of the United States in 
1868, and served in that capacity from March 4, 1869, until 
March 4, 1877, when Rutherford B. Hayes assumed office.
3 New York Tribune, May 16, 1864, p. 2.
Grant held the presidency for eight years, and all of them 
fell within the nation's Reconstruction period. Grant, 
therefore, should have been, at least in part, responsible 
for the course of the United States's Reconstruction after 
the Civil War for more than twice as long as either Lincoln 
or Johnson. Yet, his period of office remains obscured under 
the label of "Congressional Reconstruction."
Grant is in part to blame for this unusual circumstance. 
When Grant wrote his autobiography, he neglected, perhaps due 
to the advanced stage of his own terminal illness, to discuss 
his presidency in any detail. Rather, for all practical 
purposes, he ended his work with the closing of the war. 
Indeed, Grant only hints at those things which occurred 
between 1865 and 1877 in the last seven pages of his book. 
Historian William S. McFeely in the "new introduction" to 
Grant’s work, published in 1982, even went so far as to state 
that "it is not impossible that these final pages also show 
how huge doses of morphine had begun to take their toll on 
the dying writer."4 Nevertheless, those few pages are all the 
information Grant imparted to his readers on his service as 
President of the United States.
This absence of discussion by the man himself has led 
others to conclude that perhaps nothing really significant 
happened to Grant after he ended his command of the Union 
forces. Evidence to support this determination can be found 
in E. B. Long's introduction to the 1952 publication of
4 william S. McFeely, "New Introduction," E. B. Long, 
ed., Personal Memoirs Of U. S. Grant (New York, 1952; 
reprint, 1982), [5].
Grant's autobiography. In it, Long asserts that although the 
former General was also the President of the United States, 
"Grant the soldier was the real man;" and that "the rest was 
anticlimax."5 Long goes on to argue that the American people 
have been "willing to overlook the sometimes unfortunate 
years of the presidency" precisely because Grant "as a 
soldier" had "won the hearts of America."5
Others historians, such as George C. Rable, in But There 
Was No Peace. Eric Foner, in Reconstruction; America's 
Unfinished Revolution. 1863-1877. and Brooks D. Simpson in 
Let Us Have Peace; Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War 
and Reconstruction. 1861-1868. have all sought to examine 
Grant's activities, within the context of the reconstructive 
process. But in each case the attention directly related to 
Grant's presidential years has been limited.
Rable, for instance, concentrated on examining the role 
of southern violence during Reconstruction. Within that 
context, he determined that "President Ulysses S. Grant tried 
to administer the laws passed by Congress without actively 
participating in the legislative process," but Rable did not 
explain why Grant followed that course.? The author also 
discovered that "the inconsistency of Federal reconstruction 
policy" under Grant combined with the sheer "strength of 
southern resistance seemed to have doomed the reconstruction
5 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, xx.
5 Ibid., xxiii.
? George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace; The Role of 
Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction (Athens, Ga.,
1984), 191.
experiment to inevitable collapse."8 Rable's analysis did not 
center on Grant specifically, but rather approached the topic 
of Reconstruction from a different perspective. This 
approach, although well developed, failed to establish a 
complete evaluation of President Grant's activities during 
this period.
Eric Foner, in his excellent work, addressed the entire 
spectrum of Reconstruction, from the political activities of 
the individual Presidents and Congress to the economic and 
social changes which reshaped the nation. In accomplishing 
this, the author out of necessity reduced Grant to one of a 
great many historical figures that participated in the 
process. Therefore, Grant's role is deemphasized to fit into 
the greater patterns of Reconstruction, and Foner's 
references to him often take the form of general comments 
relating to his administration. For example, in evaluating 
Grant's second term, Foner finds that because it was 
"buffeted by the shifting tides of public opinion, 
preoccupied first with the economic depression and later with 
yet another wave of political scandals," that the government 
"found it impossible to devise a coherent policy toward the 
South."8 This statement, in and of itself, establishes only 
that Grant's administration in general did not find the 
correct solutions, in Foner's opinion, to the problems of 
Reconstruction. Comments like these, however, do not clearly
8 Ibid., xii.
8 Eric Foner, Reconstruction; America's Unfinished
Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 528.
establish if Grant was personally to blame for this failure. 
His role, therefore, remains hidden under the cloak of 
"Congressional Reconstruction."
In Let Us Have Peace. Brooks D. Simpson elected to adopt 
yet another approach to studying Grant's legacy, by 
evaluating his performance between 1861 and 1868. This 
author worked to demonstrate that Grant as a participant in 
Reconstruction was a better man at his job, both militarily 
and politically, than others had previously recognized. 
Unfortunately, Simpson chose to end his narrative at 
precisely the same point that others had ended theirs, the 
time at which General Grant became President Grant. This 
stopping place would certainly have been acceptable, were it 
not for the fact that in his conclusion Simpson elected to 
join the ranks of other historians by criticizing Grant's 
accomplishments during the next eight years not examined by 
his book. In his summary, he declared that "although Grant 
continued to hold fast to his ultimate objectives of reunion 
and racial justice," during his presidency, he was forced 
however grudgingly to unofficially acknowledge "that the 
price of sectional reconciliation was justice toward the 
freed-people." Simpson concluded that Grant was eventually 
compelled to give up "the vision of peace glimpsed at 
Appamatox Court House" and surrender the Freedmen to the 
control of the southern redeemers.10 Simpson neither supports 
these concluding remarks with additional arguments nor states
10 Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace; Ulysses S.
Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction. 1861-1868 
(Chapel Hill, 1991), 254.
whether or not Grant was personally responsible for this 
tragic failure. Again as before, Grant's presidency is 
criticized without an adequate supporting explanation.
Unlike the other scholars, William S. McFeely, Grant's 
principal biographer, did explain in some detail his 
presidential years in the book Grant; A Biography. But in 
writing the material, the author by choice tended to 
concentrate more on Grant the man than on the man as 
President. This often resulted in the reader being left with 
the impression of a mediocre individual who at a time of 
great crisis rose to prominence and then fell upon hard times 
as the Chief Executive of the United States. Indeed, McFeely 
implied that Grant found his life's work almost by accident—  
that after reaching the age of "nearly forty no job he liked" 
came "his way - and so he became general and president 
because he could find nothing better to do."11 This same 
basic tone dominates the book, and McFeely specifically 
declares that in the final analysis Grant " . . .  did not rise 
above limited talents or inspire others to do so in ways that 
make his administration a credit to American politics."1̂  
Statements like these severely downgrade Grant's presidency 
and clearly lead one to the conclusion that Grant's actions 
in Reconstruction must have been ineffective.
These types of comments, by historians such as McFeely, 
have consistently served to reduce President Grant's
11 William S. McFeely, Grant; A Biography (New York, 
1982), xii.
12 Ibid., 522.
importance and to conceal his efforts under the label of 
Congressional Reconstruction. Yet, they are incomplete and 
fail to explain why Grant acted as he did during his 
administration. The purpose of this paper, therefore, will 
be to determine why Ulysses S. Grant has been deemed less 
important than Lincoln, Johnson, or Congress during 
Reconstruction. It will seek to answer the following 
questions:
1. What were Grant's plans for reconstructing the 
Union?
2. Was he successful in implementing any of his plans?
3. Did his plans and actions impact the Reconstruction 
process?
In attempting to answer these questions, primary attention 
will be placed upon Grant's presidential speeches, especially 
his State of the Union addresses and proclamations. In these 
official presentations to the collective nation the President 
outlined his perception of the problems and solutions for 
dealing with the complex issues of Reconstruction. Grant's 
key objectives will then be compared to the actual historical 
events of the period to determine his successes, failures and 
influence.
CHAPTER 2
GRANT'S BACKGROUND
On March 4, 1869, Ulysses S. Grant was inaugurated as 
the eighteenth President of the United States. Initially, 
Grant, as the most famous Union general to emerge from the 
Civil War, offered much hope to the Nation. The Republican 
party had nominated him unanimously in May 1868. He had 
promised to provide the conflict-weary nation the very thing 
it desired most— "Peace."i Supporters, such as Frederick 
Douglass, a black American and former abolitionist, clearly 
expected great accomplishments from Grant's presidency. As 
Douglass stated in August 1869, several months after Grant 
had assumed office, "I say then, if General Grant goes 
forward, determines to fight it out on this line, we have 
nothing to fear . . . and the principle of equal rights will 
become everywhere practical and permanent."2 Many an American 
believed that Grant would bring the long awaited peace to the 
nation and help resolve the vexing difficulties of 
Reconstruction.
1 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols., 
Washington, DC , 1896-1899), VII, 5.
2 John W. Blassingame and John R. McKivigan, eds., The 
Frederick Douglass Papers (Series One, 5 vols., New Haven, 
1991), Series One, IV, 236.
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The new president was a complex personality who 
continues to puzzle historians. He was a man of diverse 
faces and attitudes. A simple loving family man who hated 
being away from his family for long periods, he chose 
careers, the army and politics, which demanded that he spend 
considerable amounts of time away from them. He was a man of 
war, serving in both the Mexican War and the American Civil 
War, and as the leading Union military officer in the latter 
conflict was responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands, 
if not hundreds of thousands of men. Yet, Grant was also a 
man of peace, who could not stand the sight of blood and for 
much of his later life advocated peaceful coexistence between 
the North and South, as well as between white and black 
Americans. While both he and his wife Julia Dent Grant, 
prior to the war, owned between them a total of five slaves, 
Grant played an essential role in freeing all slaves and then 
became their protector during Reconstruction. Grant 
consistently demonstrated an absolute inability to manage his 
own business affairs, and yet he achieved the positions of 
Commanding General of the United States Army in the American 
Civil War and the office of the President of the United 
States of America for two terms. Therefore, to understand 
the man, which in turn enables one to comprehend his 
subsequent impact on Reconstruction, it is necessary to 
examine the life of the leader known to the nation as Ulysses 
S. or simply "Sam" Grant.
Hiram Ulysses Grant, which was his true given name, was 
born on April 27, 1822, at Pleasant, Ohio. Typical of the
12
many contradictions in Grant's life were the various name 
changes that he experienced. Based on a meeting of the minds 
of family members, Hiram was selected as his first name. As 
a boy, Grant went by the nickname "Lyss," which was 
eventually changed to "Sam" at West Point."3 The name that 
Grant is generally known by, Ulysses S. Grant, resulted from 
a bureaucratic mistake, compounded by inflexible authorities. 
As the story goes, when Grant was appointed to West Point by 
Representative Thomas L. Hamer, the congressman forgot the 
applicant's true name. So, rather than ask, he simply wrote 
in the name Grant generally went by, Ulysses, and then 
entered the first letter of his mother's maiden name "S" for 
Simpson. When Grant reported to West Point, he found that he 
could not register as H. Ulysses Grant, the name he selected 
in order to avoid being known as "Hug" a name formed by use 
of his initials. Instead, he had to sign in as Ulysses S. 
Grant, as there was an appointment only for an individual by 
that name.4 As a result, Hiram Ulysses Grant became Ulysses 
S. Grant, and the change would help him, when during the 
Civil War, he became known as U. S. Grant or Unconditional 
Surrender Grant. These name changes were typical examples of 
Grant's willingness outside of the military, to allow others 
to direct events in his life, rather than insisting on having 
his own way.
3 E . B . Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New 
York, 1982), 6-7.
4 Ibid. For additional information regarding Grant's 
early life see, William S. McFeely, Grant; A Biography (New 
York, 1982), 1-67.
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Grant's life fell into four parts. They were as a 
soldier and participant in the Mexican War, a civilian and 
business failure, a Civil War officer and war hero, and a 
politician and President of the United States. Each period 
had its special impact on his life, and each contributed to 
Grant's handling of the complexities of Reconstruction.
Grant spent his childhood uneventfully attending school 
and helping his father, Jesse Root Grant, in his leather 
tanning business, making Grant a "tanner boy." But at age 
seventeen, his father announced to him that he was "going to 
receive" an appointment to West Point. He initially 
declined, but Jesse insisted and Grant eventually conceded. 
Grant had resisted only because he "had a very exalted idea 
of the acquirement necessary to get through" West Point and 
he "did not believe . . .[that he] possessed them, and could 
not bear the idea of failing. "5 Contrary to his apprehensions 
Grant graduated twenty-first out of a class of thirty-nine 
cadets.e Upon completing this formal military education he 
was assigned to the Fourth United States Infantry at 
Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, Missouri.
During this time Grant recognized one of his principal 
personality traits. While traveling to a duty assignment, he 
encountered a swollen river overflowing its banks. Instead 
of taking an alternate route or seeking a better crossing, 
which would have delayed his travel, Grant plunged his horse 
into the river and at great risk to himself and the horse
s Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 11.
e Ibid., 16.
forced his way across. Grant stated that one of his
"superstitions had always been when . . . [he] started to go
any where . . . not to turn back, or stop until the thing 
intended was accomplished."7 Throughout his life, he refused 
to deviate from a course of travel, or as later events would 
show, a course of action, that he had chosen. This belief 
was expanded subsequently to include his political decisions 
and loyalty to his friends as well. This characteristic
helps explain why Grant often seemed determined to batter his
way through the enemy lines, such as at Vicksburg and the 
Wilderness, when another might have considered an alternate 
course of action. Similarly, this trait serves to clarify 
Grant's relationships to both the South and Congress during 
Reconstruction.
Although his graduation from West Point required him to 
serve in the military, it was never his "intention to remain 
in the army long, but to prepare . . . [himself] for a 
professorship in some college."8 But, the United States 
annexation of Texas and the coming of the Mexican War 
intervened; the country was deprived of a college instructor, 
but gained an officer. He found himself drawn into a war 
that he actually detested rather than supported. "Bitterly 
opposed to the [annexation of Texas]," he regarded "the war 
which resulted as one of the most unjust ever waged by a 
stronger against a weaker nation."9 Duty to country over came
7 Ibid., 20-21.
8 Ibid., 21.
9 Ibid., 22.
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conscience, and Grant served with distinction. As a result 
of his actions in the field, he received promotions, to a 
"full" Second Lieutenant, then to First Lieutenant and 
finally to the rank of "Brevet Captain." In accomplishing 
this, Grant demonstrated his courage and ability to himself 
and to his peers. 10
After the war, Grant remained in the army until poor 
pay, separation from his family, and boredom led to his 
resignation on April 11, 1854. This action initiated the 
second phase of his life— that of a former Army officer 
turned civilian. In this capacity Grant's life was not a 
happy one. Between the years of 1854 and 1861, one business 
failure after another haunted him. He tried his hand at 
farming and built his own home, which according to his wife 
Julia Dent Grant "looked so unattractive that [they] 
facetiously decided to call it Hardscrabble."11 When working 
his own farm did not prove profitable, Grant leased it and 
worked the farm land of his father-in-law, Frederick Fayette 
Dent.
During these years, Grant owned slaves. In order to 
make a living for himself and his family on his father-in- 
law's farm, he used the labor of perhaps as many as twelve 
slaves. Out of these, Grant only owned one outright, a slave 
by the name of William Jones; the others belonged to Julia's
10 For additional information on Grant's Mexican War 
service see, Lloyd Lewis, Captain Sam Grant (Boston, 1950), 
131-263.
11 John Y. Simon, ed., The Personal Memoirs of Julia Dent 
Grant TMrs Ulysses S. Grant1 (Carbondale, 1975), 79.
16
father. As the volume of work required it, Grant also 
periodically hired the labor of one or two slaves from 
neighbors to augment his labor force. Grant like many other 
Southern slave holders worked alongside these blacks in the 
field and shared the hardships of farm labor. Indications 
are that Grant treated these men humanely. His wife, Julia, 
also owned a total of four slaves who worked directly with 
her on the farm. 12
In spite of Grant's best efforts and the labor of these 
slaves, illness and bad luck took its toll and "in the fall 
of 1858 . . . [Grant] sold . . . [his] stock, crops, and 
farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming."13 Grant, 
however, did not sell William, his only slave, to a new 
owner. Instead, ignoring the financial loss his action 
entailed, Grant freed William. Julia, in contrast, elected 
to keep her slaves until their eventual move to Galena, 
Illinois, a "free state" caused her to lease them to others. 
Later, during the war, Julia resumed control of her slave, 
also named Julia, and brought her on visits to the General's 
headquarters.14 Although within less than thirty years Grant, 
in his biography, expressed wonder at the South for having 
"fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the 
right of property in man," it must be recognized that he and
12 McFeely, Grant. 58-63.
13 Long, ed. Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant.106.
14 McFeely, Grant, 62-3.
his wife had at one time held their fellow beings as 
property. is
Grant then moved on to real estate forming a partnership 
with his wife's cousin, Harry Bogg. Grant believed that the 
"business might have become prosperous if . . . [he] had been 
able to wait for it to grow, is But he was not willing to do 
so. His wife found other reasons for this business failure. 
According to Julia she could never "imagine how . . . [her] 
dear husband ever thought of going into such a business, as 
he could never collect a penny that was owed to him" if the 
debtor "only expressed" regrets at not being able to pay the 
money back. She found that he "always felt sorry for them 
and never pressed" the issue.17 He also tried his hand at 
running for the office of county engineer in St. Louis, 
Missouri, but was defeated. In May 1860, Grant rejected both 
the real estate business and local politics and suffered the 
indignity of moving to Galena, Illinois, where he accepted a 
position as clerk in his father's tanning business. Grant's 
attempts at private enterprise had failed miserably, and he 
found it very difficult to meet the needs of his family.is
The American Civil War rescued Ulysses S. Grant from 
obscurity and possibly from poverty. Following the call for 
volunteers, Grant went back to the life of a soldier. During
15 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 85.
is ibid., 117.
17 Simon, ed., Julia Dent Grant. 80.
is For additional information regarding Grant's business 
years see, McFeely, Grant, 41-66 and Lewis, Captain Sam 
Grant, 333-93.
this third stage in his life, Grant established himself as 
one of the premier Union generals. His activities at the 
battles of Belmont, Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, solidified 
Grant’s reputation as a hard fighting officer. Indeed, 
Grant's "ungenerous and unchivalrous" demand for "an 
unconditional and immediate surrender" of Confederate 
Brigadier General Simon B. Buckner at Fort Donelson in 
February 1862 brought Grant fame as "Unconditional Surrender" 
Grant.19 Although later, taken by surprise during the battle 
of Shiloh, Tennessee, on April 6, 1862, Grant impressed 
President Lincoln and demonstrated that under his command the 
Union Army would fight and inflict damage on the Confederate 
forces.20
While describing Shiloh in his autobiography, Grant 
introspectively noted the two sides of his own personality—  
the grim warrior determined to stem the tide of retreat and 
the gentle man repulsed by the sights and sounds of war. In 
the evening following the decisive stand of the Union forces, 
in which thousands lost their lives, Grant sought refuge from 
the rain that pelted the survivors. "The log-house under the 
bank" in which he took shelter "had been taken as a hospital, 
and all night wounded men were brought in, their wounds 
dressed, a leg or arm amputated as the case might require." 
Grant found this "sight . . . more unendurable than 
encountering the enemy's fire, and . . . [he] returned to
19 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 159.
20 For additional information regarding the battle of 
Shiloh see, Wiley Sword, Shiloh: Bloody April (New York,
1974).
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. . . [his] tree in the rain. "21 Grant, the resolute general 
of the Union forces, was also a gentle man who could not 
stand the sights and sounds of the wounded. Grant fully 
understood the negative side of warfare and the pain that it 
created. This knowledge had a significant impact on his 
approach to Reconstruction and helped make peace and the 
avoidance of conflict the primary goal of his presidency.
Although Grant experienced personal disappointment and 
accusations of drunkenness following Shiloh, he subsequently 
oversaw a chain of northern victories. On April 30, 1863, 
for instance, having survived the initial frustrations and 
failures of a rigorous campaign, the General's command 
crossed the Mississippi River below the Confederate positions 
at Vicksburg. Cutting lose from his base of supplies, Grant 
in a series of daring attacks defeated the divided 
Confederate commanders and forced Lieutenant General John C. 
Pemberton to retreat into Vicksburg. After a lengthy but 
successful siege, the "Rock of Gibraltar" of the Southern 
Confederacy, was surrendered to Grant's forces on July 4, 
1863, cutting the rebellious states in two. This victory, in 
conjunction with that of General Gordon Meade at Gettysburg, 
turned the course of the war against the C o n f e d e r a c y  .22
From Vicksburg, Grant assumed overall command of the 
Union forces in the West and directed the operations
21 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 181.
22 For additional information regarding the battle of 
Vicksburg see, William T. Sherman, The Memoirs of William T. 
Sherman (2 vols, 1875; Reprint. New York, 1994), I, 226-51 
and James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War
Era (New York, 1988), 405-14.
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resulting in the total rout of Confederate General Braxton 
Bragg's forces at Chattanooga, Tennessee. Next, Grant, 
freshly promoted to the grade of Lieutenant General of the 
Army by a special act of Congress, assumed the overall 
command of the Union Armies. Working in conjunction with 
President Lincoln, and Generals William Tecumseh Sherman and 
Philip Henry Sheridan, Grant developed and implemented plans 
for the final defeat of the South. Although the road to 
Appomattox Court House was a long and bloody one passing 
through places like the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna 
Crossing, Cold Harbor, and Petersburg, Grant's army helped 
batter the Confederacy into submission. Grant "the butcher" 
finally, on April 9, 1865, forced General Robert E. Lee and 
his Army of Northern Virginia to s u r r e n d e r . 23
Although this harsher side that made Grant such a 
determined warrior is obvious, his softer side has often been 
overlooked. Even though Grant had shown little mercy in 
battle, in victory he revealed both mercy and forgiveness.
His liberal surrender terms at Vicksburg and Appomattox Court 
House furnished clear examples of this tendency. On July 3, 
1863, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, the commander of 
the Confederate forces at Vicksburg, proposed an armistice, 
to explore terms for the city's surrender. This provided 
Grant an opportunity offered few Civil War generals, the 
total destruction of an Army in the field by its surrender.
23 For additional information regarding the course of the 
Civil War in 1863-1865 see, Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South 
(Boston, 1960), Catton, Grant Takes Command (Boston, 1968), 
and Noah Andre Trudeau, Bloody Roads South; The Wilderness 
to Cold Harbor. Mav-June 1864 (Boston, 1989).
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Grant quickly advised Pemberton that "the useless effusion of 
blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any 
time you choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city 
and garrison."24 Although at first harsh, these terms were 
softened considerably by subsequent discussions between 
Pemberton and Grant, which took place between the lines on 
July 3, 1864, and by a subsequent exchange of correspondence. 
Grant allowed the Confederates to sign a parole agreeing not 
to take up arms against the Union until properly exchanged. 
This meant that the Confederate soldier could not with honor 
return to active duty until they were traded for a Union 
prisoner of war of equal rank, a Confederate private for a 
Union private for instance. In the interim, instead of being 
shipped off to a prison camp to await a prisoner exchange, as 
was the standard practice, they were allowed to go home. In 
addition Grant agreed that "officers . . . [would] be allowed 
their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one 
horse each. "25 The army, which had denied the North the city 
of Vicksburg and killed thousands of its men, was allowed to 
quit the war and return to their families in the hope that 
they would never return to the front. Grant advised his 
superiors that it was "a great advantage to" the Union to be 
free of the burdensome prisoners. He declared that their 
parole would save time, and free up both his troops and their 
transport ships for prompt reassignment.26 Nonetheless, Grant
24 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 290-91.
25 ibid., 292-96.
26 ibid., 297.
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had in truth shown his former enemies mercy by granting them 
an opportunity to escape the confines of unhealthy northern 
prison camps. Thus, Grant as early as 1863, had adopted a 
basic mind set that advocated that when the fighting stopped, 
the former Confederates should be allowed to go home without 
recriminations or punishment.
The liberal surrender terms granted to the Army of 
Virginia in 1865 revealed the same approach. To understand 
how liberal these terms were, it is necessary to reflect on 
the horribly bloody battles during the final year of the war. 
In May, 1864, the Army of the Potomac under Grant's command 
had moved across the Rapidan River to confront the Army of 
Northern Virginia. Over the next twelve months these two 
armies were locked in almost constant struggle until the 
surrender at Appomattox on April 9, 1865. During that period 
of combat, the Army of the Potomac suffered in excess of 
eighty thousand casualties. It would have been easy for 
General Grant, after being forced to expend the his troops in 
exhausting combat, to have sought revenge against his enemy. 
Instead, he sought to end the bloodshed quickly and to bring 
peace to the nation.27
On April 9, 1864, when Grant received an inquiry from 
General Lee as to possible terms, he responded that he was 
"equally anxious for peace." Grant advised Lee that "the 
terms upon which peace" could be obtained were "well
27 For information regarding the fighting during 1864 
see, General Horace Porter, Campaigning With Grant (New York, 
1897), 35-466 and Bruce Catton, A Stillness at Appomattox 
(Garden City, 1953).
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understood" and that "by the South laying down their arms" it 
would "hasten the most desirable event, save thousands of 
lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet 
destroyed. "28 Grant's plan for peace was a simple one. If 
the Confederates surrendered their weapons and stopped 
fighting, the war would end.
In effect, those were the conditions that Lee and Grant 
finally settled upon. Lee's army agreed to give up their 
weapons and military equipment, with the exception of the 
officers' pistols, personal baggage, and private horses. In 
addition, each company or regimental commander was required 
to "sign a parole for the men of their commands" not to take 
up arms against the Union, until properly exchanged, while 
the officers signed personal paroles to the same effect.
When this was accomplished, Grant promised that "each officer 
and man . . . [would] be allowed to return to their homes, 
not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as 
they observe[d] their paroles and the laws in force where 
they r e s i d e . "29 Again, as at Vicksburg, Grant offered to 
allow the Confederate soldiers to go home, and live 
undisturbed unless they violated the surrender terms. Even 
as Lee's army carried out the formalities of surrender, Grant 
treated his former adversaries with sensitivity. "When news 
of the surrender first reached" the Army of the Potomac's 
lines at Appomattox, his troops "commenced firing a salute of 
a hundred guns in the honor of the victory." Grant promptly
28 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 353.
29 Ibid., 556-57.
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sent orders "to have it stopped" as "the confederates were 
. . . prisoners, and . . . [he] did not want to exult over 
their downfall."30
After Lee's surrender at Appomattox, the final events of 
the Civil War were quickly played out. President Lincoln was 
assassinated, Andrew Johnson assumed the vacant office, the 
remaining armies of the Confederacy surrendered, and 
Jefferson Davis, the President of the defeated Confederacy, 
was captured. During this period, Grant helped bring the war 
to a conclusion and returned home a hero to the North.
In December 1865, Grant toured the South. He reported 
to President Johnson that based on his observations "the 
citizens of the southern states . . . [were] anxious to 
return to self-government, within the Union, as soon as 
possible." They were, he advised "in earnest in wishing, to 
do what they think is required by the government," but "not 
humiliating to them as citizens" in order to return to equal 
status in the Union. Grant declared that "if such a course 
were pointed out," southerners "would pursue it in good 
faith." According to Grant, peace was possible, if the Union 
under the direction of President Johnson and the Republican 
Congress would only designate the proper course.3i
As Grant later explained in his autobiography, he 
believed from the beginning of Reconstruction that "the 
people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back
30 ibid., 559.
31 Senate Executive Document No. 2, 39th Congress, 1st 
Session, 107, cited in Walter L. Fleming, ed., Documentary 
History of Reconstruction (Gloucester, Mass., 1960), 51-52.
into the Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of 
the nation." But the North would have to take certain steps 
to accomplish the reunion expeditiously. Grant felt that 
"the nearer they [the South] were placed to an equality with 
the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they 
would feel with their old antagonists." The former rebels 
"surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they 
had a yoke about their n e c k s . "32 Thus, the essential 
prerequisite, was to find a plan which allowed for the speedy 
admission of the South back into the Union on an equal basis, 
and with minimal insult to their feelings, while 
simultaneously maintaining the fruits of the victory.
Although this was not an easy combination to discover, it was 
the goal to be pursued.
In the eyes of many contemporaries, including Grant, 
President Johnson refused to follow the guidance of Congress 
and thereby failed to find the right approach to 
Reconstruction.33 a s a result Grant, the military hero, 
became a natural choice for the presidency. Grant, rather 
than Johnson, could deliver that office to the Republican 
Party, based on his popularity with northerners in general 
and the Union veterans in particular. He was a popular 
figure among both white Americans in the North and black 
Americans in the North and South. Unlike other Union 
generals before him, Grant had defeated Lee. He and his men
32 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 567.
33 For additional information on President Johnson and 
Reconstruction see, Foner, Reconstruction. 176-333 and Hans 
L. Trefousse, Andrew Johnson: A Biography (New York, 1989).
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had won the war and helped destroy slavery. As Frederick 
Douglass declared to his audience on August 3, 1869, in 
Medina, New York, Grant as President, "with powers augmented 
and conceded, with a great party . . . behind him, with a 
military record dazzling all over with splendor, with a 
character that defies impeachment," possessed all that was 
necessary to overcome the opposition.34 According to 
Douglass, Grant held the power needed to resolve the many 
difficulties facing black Americans and the nation.
But, by Grant's own admission, there was one flaw in 
Douglass' projection. The potential candidate was not a 
politician. Indeed, up until the end of the American Civil 
War, the political arena held little attraction for Grant, 
the civilian or the soldier. His only previous personal 
political involvement had ended in defeat. As Grant reminded 
the nation in his final Annual Message to Congress on 
December 5, 1876, it had been his "fortune, or misfortune, to 
be called to the office of Chief Executive without any 
previous political training." After his seventeenth birthday 
he had but twice "witnessed the excitement [of] a 
Presidential campaign" prior to his own election, and had 
been "eligible as a voter" only once.35 Grant had exhibited 
absolutely no interest in politics either as a witness to the 
political process or as an actual voter, failing to even 
establish his own eligibility to vote for much of his life.
34 Blassingame and McKivigan, eds., Frederick Douglass 
Papers. IV, 236.
35 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 399.
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Further, his civilian business ventures, which had 
consistently failed, offered no help to the potential 
candidate.
Instead, Grant's successful experiences in dealing with 
people came in the military context where he gave orders that 
were to be obeyed. As President, he would need to give 
orders diplomatically and persuasively and to insure they 
were complied with as requested, and it was precisely in this 
area that Grant lacked experience. This deficiency, combined 
with his previous "press ahead" style practiced so 
effectively at the swollen river and during the war, 
seriously limited Grant1s political skills.
Nevertheless, as the political crisis escalated and the 
conflict deepened between President Johnson and the 
Republican Congress, Grant was drawn into the world of 
politics. In the end, Grant accepted the Republican 
nomination. As he explained to his friend and wartime ally, 
William T. Sherman, the office was not one that he would 
"occupy for any mere personal consideration" but rather one 
that he had "been forced into . . .  in spite of" himself.
Grant claimed that his refusal to run would leave "the 
contest for power . . . between mere trading politicians, the 
elevation of whom, no matter which party won" would 
jeopardize "the results of the costly war."36 While these 
statements appear self-serving, it must be remembered that 
they were written to Grant's personal friend and that
36 John Y. Simon, ed., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant (20 
vols., Carbondale), XVIII, 292.
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throughout the subsequent eight years he steadfastly held to 
these beliefs.
On May 21, 1868, General John A. Logan nominated Grant 
to head the National Union Republican party ticket, and he 
accepted eight days later. In his letter of acceptance to 
Joseph R. Hawley, Chairman of the Republican party, Grant 
outlined the program he would follow faithfully during his 
tenure as President. He stated that if elected he would 
"endeavor to administer the laws, in good faith, with 
economy, and with the view of giving peace, quiet and 
protection every where." These, in simple terms, were the 
basics of Grant's plan to help the nation through 
Reconstruction. He declined to give further details, for "in 
times like" those it was "impossible, or at least improper, 
to lay down a policy to be adhered to, right or wrong, 
through an Administration of four years." Grant explained 
that "a purely Administrative Officer should always be left 
free to execute the will of the people" and that he, had 
"always . . . respected that will" and would continue to do 
so. In closing his letter of acceptance, Grant declared that 
"Peace, and universal prosperity, in sequence, with economy 
of administration" would "lighten the burden of taxation" and 
reduce "the national debt." And he emphasized "let us have 
peace."37 Indeed, this was the same clear message conveyed by 
his surrender terms at Vicksburg and Appomatox and in an 
April 1868 letter to Thaddeus Stevens, Chairman of the 
Committee on Reconstruction. In it Grant recommended "the
37 Ibid, 263-64.
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removal of the disabilities, imposed by the reconstruction 
acts," on the Confederate General James Longstreet. Although 
Longstreet had been a fierce adversary, Grant argued that 
his behavior "since the surrender of the rebel army, and his 
high character always, both before and since the rebellion, 
entitle[d] him to the confidence of all good citizens."38 
Later, when opportunity presented itself, Grant as President, 
would extend, by signing the Amnesty Act of 1872, the same 
consideration to all repentant southerners who behaved as had 
Longstreet.
As the election neared, the nation undoubtedly pondered 
the qualifications and skills of presidential candidate 
Grant. In light of the stated views of current historians 
such as E. B. Long, Brooks D. Simpson and William S. McFeely, 
it is interesting to note that the American electorate of 
1867 had a very good knowledge of Grant’s background, 
personality, and skills. Everyone knew of his plebeian 
heritage and his work as a clerk in his father's tanning 
business. Indeed, references to Grant’s childhood were used 
as the title of a publication on his early years, which was 
advertised in the May 16, 1864, issue of the New York 
Tribune. Readers were promised that the new book, entitled 
"The Tanner Boy, and How He Became Lieutenant-General," which 
was "written by a well-known author," would provide the 
reader with "a complete and authentic record from boyhood to 
the present time" of the General's life. It also promised, 
with total assurance, that when the work was completed it
38 ibid., 240-41.
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would record Grant's role as the "Savior of His Country" and 
man who would oversee the successful "Overthrow of the 
Rebellion."39 Grant's prior civilian profession was no secret 
to the voters in the election, although the extent of his 
failures in business may not have been such common knowledge.
His grim determination not to retire in the face of 
resistance and his military skills were widely known for they 
had been consistently reported to the nation throughout the 
lengthy war. During the conflict both the New York Times and 
the New York Tribune described in detail the determined and 
unrelenting approach of Grant to the military conflict. As 
an example, the New York Times in a May 26, 1863, editorial 
cited Grant's strong points as a general as an: "absolute
singleness of purpose," and "a most extraordinary combination 
of energy and persistence." These traits made him, "the most 
serviceable, and, therefore, the most valuable, officer in 
the national army. "4° The New York Tribune on the other hand 
almost pitied the hapless Confederates confronting a 
relentless General Grant. The newspaper noted on May 14,
1864, as the Army of the Potomac under Grant hammered its way 
into Virginia, that it was "terrible - this devouring, 
unwearied, cold energy with which Gen. Grant presses the 
enemy over whom he has obtained an advantage. "4i Only those 
that had not read a newspaper or had ignored the events of
39 New York Tribune, May 16, 1864, p. 2.
40 New York Times. May 26, 1863, p. 4.
41 New York Tribune. May 14, 1864, p. 6.
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the war, could have been unaware of this side of Grant's 
personality.
Grant's war record was also well known throughout the 
nation. National newspapers, such as the New York Times and 
New York Tribune had heralded each of his successes. Upon 
hearing the news of Grant's victory at Vicksburg, the New 
York Tribune on July 8, 1863, proclaimed that "the steady 
purpose, the unshaken fortitude, the fertile talent, the 
heroic determination of Gen. GRANT, and the courage of his 
noble army, are crowned at last with success." The story 
went on to proclaim that "Unconditional Surrender" Grant, by 
his victory had divided the Confederacy, destroyed "its 
political coherence," and "shattered" its military strength.42 
The New York Times, as early as May 1863, declared that "U.S. 
Grant— or, as his soldiers style him, Unconditional Surrender 
Grant" had "given the Confederacy blows such [as] no other 
arm . . . [had] dealt" and that if he were not diverted by 
the politicians he would "in due time bring the whole concern 
to the dust." The newspaper predicted total victory from the 
western general. This same daily, upon the conclusion of the 
war, continued to praise Grant by reminding the nation that 
"three rebel armies . . . [had] surrendered to Gen. Grant—  
that under Buckner . . ., that under Pemberton . . . and that 
under Gen. Lee . . . "  and that he was "the only one . . . 
who . . . ever induced a rebel army to surrender"43 Few who
42 Ibid., July 8, 1863, pp. 1-4.
43 New York Times. April 11, 1865, p. 4.
read these articles and editorials could mistake that Grant 
was the war's premier Union commander.
Grant's actions to hasten the end of the war were also 
greatly appreciated and reported with favor in the press. On 
April 12, 1865, the New York Times, applauded Grant's 
decision to send the Army of Virginia home in peace. The 
article asserted that Grant's peace negotiations made "the 
cumbrous and dubious phrases of diplomacy . . . unnecessary" 
and saved "the national authorities . . . the unsavory task 
of covenanting with the political leaders of the r e b e l l i o n . "44 
Grant's surrender terms not only brought an end to the 
conflict in Virginia but expedited a national peace as well. 
Much later, during the presidential campaign itself, the New 
York Tribune also recalled Grant's efforts as a soldier and 
military diplomat in bringing the war to a conclusion. Grant 
"was ever a magnanimous foe" and "he fought, not to degrade, 
and destroy, but to exalt and to s a v e . "45
Further, the nation knew that Grant lacked "political" 
experience; however, this was deemed a credit rather than a 
debit. In the initial stages of the presidential campaign, 
his opponents questioned whether "success in war [should] be 
the highest recommendation to the P residency? "46 But as the 
conventions were held and the people moved to support Grant, 
the New York Tribune ceased its resistance and acknowledged 
that "the people had already decided that they would vote for
44 ibid., April 12, 1865, p. 4.
45 New York Tribune, May 22, 1868, p. 4.
46 ibid., January 6, 1868, p. 1.
ULYSSES S. GRANT, and nobody else." The paper acknowledged 
that it had "tried for a while to persuade them that they 
could do better, but they would not hear" of it. The 
Tribune conceded that Grant would win and predicted "that 
both his Electoral and Popular majorities" would exceed those 
received by either candidate in the election of 1864.47 The 
New York Times on the other hand simply changed the handicap 
to a strength by arguing that the nation would be better 
served by a man who had no political experience or alliances. 
In June 1867, the Times observed that the former General was 
the only Presidential Candidate who was not so involved in 
"party projects, so committed to special policies . . ., so 
hampered by having 'friends to reward and enemies to punish' 
as to destroy all public faith in his disinterested 
independence." The paper asserted that Grant would "make the 
public good" his "sole guide."4s Grant's lack of political 
experience was either overlooked or applauded.
Finally, no promise meant more to both the North and 
South than Grant's promise of peace. The nation and the 
press demanded it. According to the New York Times. he 
offered the nation a candidate who could reasonably draw 
support from both his friends and former foes. On June 11, 
1867, the newspaper argued that there was no "reason to 
believe that the people of the Southern States would regard 
. . . [Grant's candidacy] as galling to their pride or in any
47 Ibid., May 22, 1868, p. 4.
4® New York Times. June 11, 1867, p. 4.
way hostile to their w e l f a r e . "49 The General through his 
efforts on the behalf of the former rebel soldiers at 
Vicksburg and Appomatox offered the South peace rather than 
war. On January 22, 1868, the New York Times further argued 
that "the temper and manner in which . . . [Grant] accepted 
the surrender of Gen. Lee and the Confederate army and the 
Confederate cause" had marked him "above all others, best 
able to lead the nation to a just, solid and abiding peace."5° 
The more cautious New York Tribune also deemed Grant's 
election a boon for the chances for peace. As the election 
neared, the paper advised the nation that "if Gen. Grant 
shall be elected President no man fears, or even affects to 
fear, a reign of violence or terrorism. "5i Peace and an end 
to conflict was the promise that Grant made, and the people 
found it a distinct possibility.
Regardless of which of these factors had the greatest 
influence on the electorate, historians readily agree that 
Grant's national reputation made his election almost 
inevitable. Historian Eric Foner contends that Grant had 
"emerged from the conflict as the preeminent Union military 
hero" and that as early as 1866 "influential Republicans were 
[already] predicting his nomination."52 Brooks D. Simpson, 
determined that by late 1867, "it appeared obvious to all but 
the most die-hard Radicals that Ulysses S. Grant would be the
49 ibid.
so ibid., January 22, 1868, p. 4.
si New York Tribune, August 14, 1868, p. 4.
52 Foner, Reconstruction. 337.
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Republican nominee for president in 1 8 6 8 ."53 william S. 
McFeely concurred when he noted that "Grant's political 
position in the spring of 1868 was unassailable." He was 
"hated by few voters and by no close observers powerful 
enough to influence the electorate." Further, he had managed 
to remain aloof "from the vulgar business" of Johnson’s 
impeachment trial and "alone appeared clean" out of all of 
the potential candidates for the office.54 McFeely also found 
that Grant's position was further strengthened by a vote of 
confidence from the Civil War veterans who met in Chicago in 
that same year and announced their support for their former
commander .55
In any case, by 1868 Grant clearly was the leading 
candidate for the office, and the American people concluded 
that Grant could fulfill his promise to them. They also felt 
that they understood the man, along with his skills and 
personality traits, and that he would make a good president. 
His sterling military record and promise of peace helped 
convince a majority of the American voters to chose him as 
their President, and he defeated his Democratic opponent, 
Horatio Seymour, by a popular vote of 3,012,833 to 2,703,249 
and a electoral vote of 214 to 80. As Brooks D. Simpson 
noted, Grant's "vote totals exceeded by over 110,000 those of 
the Republicans running with him, suggesting that he was more
53 Simpson, Let Us Have Peace. 225.
54 McFeely, Grant, 274-75.
55 ibid., 276.
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popular than the party and may have been essential to its 
triumph. "56
Upon assuming the highest political office of the land 
Grant brought with him his own varied experiences as a 
business failure, as the nation's most successful military 
officer, and as a political leader who possessed an almost 
total absence of previous political training as a voter or 
office holder. In addition, Grant harbored a grim 
determination based largely upon superstition, to finish what 
he had started without altering his course. Upon reporting 
the decision of the American electorate the New York Tribune 
declared that with the General's election "the last of the 
great issues— the social and political Reconstruction of the 
South, was also determined," and that the nation could "now 
look forward to a long era of peace and prosperity."57 The 
prediction was premature.
56 Simpson, Let Us Have Peace. 251. For additional 
information on the election of 1868 see, Foner, 
Reconstruction. 333-345.
57 New York Tribune, November 4, 1868, p. 2.
CHAPTER 3
THE FORMER PLANS OF RECONSTRUCTION
From his election in November 1868 to his inauguration 
in March 1869 Grant had several months in which to develop 
his plans for rebuilding the nation. He had certain distinct 
advantages over his two immediate presidential predecessors 
in formulating his blueprint for Reconstruction. Lincoln had 
been at a severe disadvantage since the nation was engaged in 
a savage war in which winning was of paramount importance and 
by no means certain. His program necessarily had to take 
into consideration the application of the majority of the 
nation's resources to fighting the enemy rather than making 
peace. Johnson had faced a different set of difficulties. 
Forced into the office by an assassin's bullet, he had to 
make plans which took into consideration those of his 
predecessor, could be formulated quickly, and would be 
implemented when the war was ending and victory was at hand.
The newly elected Grant, however, had time to carefully 
develop his approach to Reconstruction from his election in 
November 1868 to his inauguration in April 1869. In 
addition, Grant had three programs to review: those of
Lincoln, Johnson, and Congress. He could have examined the 
key elements of each of them in order to determine their 
strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, to fully understand
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Grant's options, it is necessary to examine each of the three 
plans which had been implemented prior to his election.
On December 8, 1863, Lincoln had presented the first 
Reconstruction strategy to the American people. In this 
plan, known commonly as the "10 percent" plan, Lincoln 
stipulated how a Confederate could obtain a full pardon and 
how a rebellious state could rejoin the Union. First,
Lincoln advised that the only condition for obtaining a 
pardon was that a person must "take and subscribe an oath" 
and then keep it. The oath required rebels to ". . . 
solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God" to abide by and 
preserve the Constitution of the United States and to support 
the programs of both Congress and the President as they 
related to the institution of slavery.1 Having done so, 
individuals were allowed to rejoin the ranks of the Union 
population as loyal citizens. Lincoln's plan excluded some 
ex-Confederates who had taken a leading role in the rebellion 
and might pose a continuing threat to the Union. This ban 
included key Confederate governmental officials and military 
officers who had held at least the rank of colonel in the 
army or lieutenant in the n a v y . 2
Lincoln also outlined how seceded states could regain 
their previous status within the Union. Whenever one-tenth 
of the population of a repentant state, based on the number 
of votes cast in the presidential election of 1860, had given
1 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols., 
Washington, DC, 1896-1899), VI, 213-14.
2 Ibid., 214.
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their oath and remained faithful to it, then the people of 
that state were authorized to reform their government. The 
new state was also required to adopt and insure a republican 
form of government.3
Lincoln advised that he would look favorably on any 
provisions adopted by the newly formed state governments that 
recognized and declared for the "permanent freedom" of the 
former slaves and provided for their "education." He also 
indicated that he would concur with the actions of any state 
that used the same name or boundaries which had been in use 
before the war. The only states excluded from Lincoln's 
rather brief Reconstruction plan were those such as Maryland 
and Kentucky in which the government had remained loyal to 
the Union during the rebellion at hand and, therefore, did 
not require reconstruction.4 in the final sentences of his 
plan, Lincoln reminded the rebellious states that Congress 
alone would determine who would be seated as members of that 
body in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of 
the United States of America. In this way Lincoln attempted 
to warn the South not to send their former Confederate 
leaders to represent them in Congress.5
Lincoln's plan had much to recommend it to Grant. The 
very simplicity of this proposal seemed to work in its favor. 
It promised the speedy return of the states to their peaceful 
and equal status within the Union on very liberal terms.
3 ibid.
4 Ibid., 214-15. 
s Ibid.
Since it called for only 10 percent of a state's 1860 voters 
to support it, the plan required little or no support from 
rebellious southerners. Moreover, Lincoln had to be 
magnanimous if his plan were to be adopted by the South, 
because he was still in the midst of the war. In December 
1863, although the North held an apparent and significant 
military advantage, the war had yet to be won. Thus it was 
to Lincoln's benefit to offer peace at such a small price 
compared to the severe cost of continuing a tragic conflict. 
Grant, on the other hand, faced a situation in which the war 
was over, but a true and lasting peace between the two 
sections had yet to be realized.
For a period of approximately one year Lincoln’s plan 
appeared workable. Lincoln, in his fourth annual message to 
Congress on December 6, 1864, had reported that "12,000 
citizens in each of the States of Arkansas and Louisiana 
[had] organized loyal State governments, with free 
constitutions" and they were "earnestly struggling to 
maintain and administer them." He noted similar movements in 
Missouri, Kentucky, and Tennessee and proclaimed "complete 
success" in Maryland.6 Lincoln confidently reminded the South 
that peace could be obtained "simply by laying down their 
arms and submitting to the national authority under the 
Constitution." He made it clear that his program of 
Reconstruction was open to modification: "If questions
should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of 
legislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only in
6 Ibid., 251-52.
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constitutional channels."7
Grant also knew that Congress in its own way had made it 
clear that the price of rebellion would be much higher. In 
direct response to Lincoln's 10 percent plan, Congress 
approved the Wade-Davis Bill in 1864. This legislation 
challenged not only the President's primary role in 
Reconstruction but also his plan as well. The bill required 
a majority of the white voting population of a rebellious 
state to take the loyalty oath before establishing their new 
state governments. In addition, it mandated laws insuring 
equality for black Americans in their respective states. 
Lincoln responded to this legislative challenge with a pocket 
veto, signaling the beginning of a struggle between the 
President and Congress over the correct course of 
Reconstruction. While Lincoln, a noted debater and brilliant 
negotiator, might have been able to convince Congress of the 
justice of his position or have negotiated an acceptable 
compromise, John Wilkes Booth ended the president's 
participation in the debate.
Lincoln's plan, while simple and brief, offered limited 
advantages for Grant. Although this plan appeared to offer a 
speedy peace, Congress had already challenged it and its 
brilliant author was dead. The plan's moment had passed, and
7 ibid., 254. For additional information on Lincoln's 
Reconstruction policies see, Eric Foner, Reconstruction; 
America's Unfinished Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 
1-170.
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even if it had remaining viability, Grant was not the 
skillful debater or negotiator that Lincoln had been.
The second plan available for Grant's review was that of 
President Andrew Johnson. While the "accidental president" 
did not immediately announce his own programs during his 
brief Inaugural Address of April 15, 1865, Johnson did put 
his plan before the country in a Presidential Proclamation, 
dated May 29, 1865. The new President offered an "amnesty 
and pardon" to all who had joined in the rebellion. This act 
of forgiveness would be granted when the individual agreed to 
"take and subscribe" to the oath provided in the President's 
proclamation. Johnson's new oath was much shorter than the 
one proposed by Lincoln, but it covered the same basic 
requirements. It called upon the signer to "faithfully 
support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States" and to "support all laws and proclamations which have 
been made during the . . . rebellion with reference to the 
emancipation of slaves."8
Of course Johnson, as had Lincoln, listed the types of 
individuals who were excluded from his amnesty and pardon 
provisions. Those people banned from consideration were 
divided into fourteen specific groups that ranged from 
Confederates who had served as diplomats or military officers 
above the rank of colonel in the army or lieutenant in the 
navy and who had resigned from the United States military to 
avoid duty in putting down the rebellion, to "all persons who 
. . . [had] voluntarily participated" in the rebel cause and
8 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VI, 310.
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whose "estimated . . . taxable property" exceeded $20,000.9 
The President, however, did not absolutely preclude even 
those who fell within these groups from receiving a pardon 
under his proclamation. Instead, he allowed for "special 
application" directly to the President and assured these 
excepted classes that "clemency . . . [would] be liberally 
extended" if the individual maintained "the peace and dignity 
of the United States."10
This Proclamation of May 29, 1865, not only outlined a 
significant part of Johnson's program for Reconstruction, it 
also informed the Union of two facts. First, it established 
that, as far as Johnson was concerned, almost anyone in the 
South could be excused for their past deeds as long as they 
were willing to sign the necessary oath or seek a "liberally 
extended" Presidential pardon. Clearly, this provision 
advised all former Confederates that retribution would not be 
an integral part of Johnson's program. Second, the 
proclamation revealed that President Johnson wanted to direct 
the course of Reconstruction and that he expected Congress to 
follow his lead. Guilty parties from the South had to seek 
Johnson's personal Presidential pardon which, in turn, would 
not be subject to the review and approval of any other branch 
of the government. The South, it appeared, needed to 
concentrate on satisfying Johnson rather than Congress.
On that same day, Johnson issued not one, but two 
Presidential proclamations. In the second of these he
9 Ibid., 311.
10 Ibid.
informed the nation that the rebellion in the South had "been 
almost entirely overcome." He advised, therefore, that since 
the war had deprived the citizens of North Carolina of "all 
civil government" it was now his duty under the Constitution 
to help them establish a new and loyal one. Johnson 
appointed William W. Holden as the state's provisional 
governor and directed him to develop essential guidelines for 
a convention to revise North Carolina's constitution.
Johnson argued that this process would allow the "loyal 
people" of the state to renew their "constitutional relations 
to the Federal Government." Johnson stipulated that no 
elector for or participant in the convention was to serve 
unless he had already "taken and subscribed" to Johnson's 
Amnesty Oath. Further, only those who were eligible to vote 
prior to May 20, 1861, the date North Carolina passed its 
ordinance of secession, were allowed to participate in this 
process.11 This, of course, excluded all new potential 
voters, such as newly emancipated black Americans, since they 
had not been eligible to vote before that date.
Thus, President Johnson encouraged not only North 
Carolina, but all the former Confederate States, to 
expeditiously reestablish their relationships with the 
Federal Government by state constitutional conventions under 
his guidance. Unlike Lincoln, Johnson did not require that a 
certain percentage of the people take the "oath" of 
allegiance before the state held its convention. No guidance 
was given on this question, thus allowing the people of each
ii Ibid., 312-13.
45
state to decide how many people needed to take the oath 
before they rewrote their constitution. Johnson also 
authorized the states to thereafter "prescribe the 
qualification of electors and the eligibility of persons to 
hold office under the constitution and laws of the State," 
thus effectively removing these decisions from the authority 
of the federal government and allowing blacks to be
excluded. 12
This second part of Johnson's announced plan enabled the 
former Confederate States to define their own state 
governments and their relationship with the federal 
government. Even further, as part of his proclamation 
regarding North Carolina, Johnson instructed all military and 
naval personnel within that state to aid the people.13 
Between May 29, 1865, and July 13, 1865, seven such 
proclamations were issued, including the one for North 
Carolina. Johnson called on the states of Mississippi, 
Georgia, Texas, Alabama, South Carolina and Florida to 
accomplish the necessary steps to return to the Union under 
the provisions of his plan.
During this same time period, Johnson continued to 
dismantle the Union's war machine. He sought to send 
everyone, including the captured Confederate soldiers, home 
and to insure a peaceful resolution of the nation's 
difficulties. For example, on June 6, 1865, Johnson issued 
General Orders, No. 109, outlining the steps to be followed
12 ibid., 313.
13 ibid.
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in releasing prisoners of war. Under his orders, all 
Confederate enlisted men and seamen, as well as naval petty 
officers, were to be released after taking the prescribed 
oath. Certain junior army and navy officers were released 
under the same conditions. Thus, Johnson sent Confederate 
prisoners home with few restrictions and without 
retribution.14
By December 1865, Johnson proclaimed Reconstruction 
under his plan complete, but he, as Grant knew well enough, 
had underestimated the reactions of both the North and South 
to his plan. Although his programs promised a speedy 
reunification of the North and South, Johnson had failed to 
take into consideration a wide range of issues which produced 
a bitter and fruitless battle with the opposing Radical 
Republicans.
The North, although lacking a specific plan for 
rebuilding the South, had certain expectations of the 
President's plan. They desired that slavery, destroyed by 
the war, be replaced with the northern principles of free 
labor. They also required that the South be placed under the 
firm control of the federal government and kept in line so 
rebellion would not resurface.is
Even more important, the Republican party had certain 
demands that were unmet by the President's program.
14 Ibid., 340. For additional information on Johnson's 
Reconstruction policies see, Foner, Reconstruction, 176-333 
and Hans L. Trefousse, Andrew Johnson; A Biography (New 
York, 1989).
Nina Sibler, The Romance of Reunion (Chapel Hill,
1993), 24.
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Republicans wanted the former Confederate states to 
understand that they had lost the war and in that 
understanding to accept the repudiation of secession, the 
reality of emancipation, and the dominance of the Republican 
party. The Republicans required a repentant South, and not a 
resistant one.i6
The Radical Republicans, a small and powerful sub-group 
within the greater Republican party, added one more demand to 
the President's program. These "Radicals," joined by many 
former abolitionists, had initiated a program in 1865 to 
persuade the North that suffrage for the freedmen was an 
essential element of Reconstruction. Without it, they were 
convinced the process could never be successful.i?
But, Johnson's plan did not include specific provisions 
to insure compliance with these northern demands. His 
program was too easy on the former Confederate states and 
allowed them immediate access to the Federal Government which 
others were not so willing to grant. Moreover, the South 
betrayed Johnson's generosity by establishing the harsh 
"Black Codes" through state legislative action.
In Mississippi for instance, the "codes" required all 
freedmen to have written documentation of employment by the 
first of each new year. Failure to do so could result in the 
individual being arrested as a vagrant, punishable by fines 
or forced plantation labor. Southerners even reenacted all 
previous state laws that had pertained to the conduct of
16 Foner, Reconstruction. 224.
17 ibid., 221.
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slaves and free blacks prior to the war. South Carolina's 
"codes" limited the freedmen's choice of occupations in the 
state. A free black was welcome to become a farmer or 
servant, but had to pay a special yearly tax to the state if 
he pursued another career, such as that of artisan or 
craftsman. These state laws served to restrict and confine 
the freedmen to specific roles within southern society and 
denied them their political and civil rights. Indeed, they 
were in reality a southern attempt to reestablish slavery by 
another name and method.is
In addition, many of the former rebellious states 
decided to reelect to office the same men that they had 
followed during the war. For example, the Georgia State 
Legislature sent Alexander H. Stephens, the former Vice 
President of the Confederacy, to the United States Senate.
Many Northerners were outraged at the South's audacity.is
In response to these events, the Thirty-Ninth Congress 
rejected and condemned Johnson's plans for Reconstruction.
Both the Senate and House of Representatives refused to seat 
the elected delegates from the "reconstructed" southern 
states. Congress countered with its own programs by passing 
the Freedmen's Bill and then the Civil Rights bill. The 
first of these sought to extend the one year life span of the 
Freedmen's Bureau, which had been established in March 1865, 
to provide aid to both freedmen and refugees in the South.
This government agency helped the recipients find jobs,
is Ibid., 199-200. 
is Ibid., 196.
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sought to establish fair labor contracts with land owners, 
and investigated freedmen's claims of unfair treatment. It 
was intended that the new bill would extend the bureau's 
operations indefinitely and provide for direct federal 
funding. The second law attempted, at the Federal level, to 
define the rights and privileges of American citizenship and 
to prevent others, including the government, from denying 
these rights to American citizens, regardless of their race.
Johnson vetoed both bills and initiated a bitter quarrel 
with Congress over the course of Reconstruction. On February 
19, 1866, the president expressed "much regret" that he could 
not approve the Freedmen's Bureau bill. Johnson argued that 
there was "no immediate necessity for the proposed measure," 
that it would "keep the mind of the freeman in a state of 
uncertain expectation and restlessness," and would to the 
rest of the South "be a source of constant and vague
apprehension."20
On March 27, 1866, The Civil Rights Bill met the same 
fate. Johnson informed Congress and the nation that the bill 
contained measures which were unacceptable based on his 
"sense of duty to the whole people" and his "obligations to 
the Constitution of the United States." While Johnson 
marshaled a wide variety of arguments to defend his veto, he 
summarized them by declaring that the bill was designed "to 
operate in favor of the colored and against the white race," 
that it interfered "with the municipal legislation of the 
states," and that it promoted "the centralization and the
20 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VI, 398-405.
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concentration of all legislative powers in the National 
Government. "21
Congress passed both bills over the President's veto. 
From this point on, Johnson and Congress struggled 
continually over who would direct the rebuilding of the 
nation, until Johnson's opponents sought his impeachment. As 
the New York Tribune argued the prosecution's case on April 
20, 1868, Johnson was "an aching tooth in the National Jaw, a 
screeching infant in a crowded lecture-room, and there . . . 
[could] be no peace nor comfort till he . . . [was] out."22 
Although Johnson narrowly averted impeachment in 1867, the 
conflict destroyed his power as chief executive.
As a model for President Grant, Johnson's battered plans 
offered little, except an example of what to avoid. Johnson 
had turned to the nation and particularly the South for 
support in his contest with Congress, and he had lost. Grant 
understood this lesson; in his autobiography, he observed 
that Johnson had by "fighting Congress on the one hand, and 
receiving support of the South on the other" compelled the 
Republican-controlled Congress to pass "first one measure and 
then another to restrict his power." This conflict, 
according to Grant, eventually forced Congress and the 
majority of the Northern state legislatures to grant suffrage 
to black Americans in the South in order to gain their
21 Ibid., 405-13.
22 New York Tribune. April 20, 1868, p. 4.
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support for Republican p o l i c i e s .23 Grant clearly recognized 
that Johnson's plans had led to disaster.
When President Johnson vetoed both the Freedmen's Bureau 
and the Civil Rights Bill, Congress had developed the final 
plan for Grant's review. It was intended to replace the 
President's unacceptable proposals. Since it was in effect 
throughout much of the South at the time of Grant's election, 
it commanded his attention.
In March 1867 Congress established the first major plank 
of that program by passing the first Reconstruction Act, 
which effectively divided the South into five military 
districts. United States Army officers governed these 
districts and were charged with the responsibility of helping 
reconstruct these former Confederate states. They reported 
directly to General Grant, the commander of the Army. This 
law effectively destroyed the state governments established 
under Johnson and reduced his power since the military 
governors no longer reported to him. As a result, the 
various states proceeded to draft constitutions which 
authorized suffrage for black American males and established 
state governments based on Republican support. In July 1867 
Congress passed supplemental laws which further granted the 
military governors the authority to select and to replace 
state officials when necessary to advance the cause of 
Republican Reconstruction in the southern states.24
23 Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant. 567.
24 For additional information on Congressional 
Reconstruction see, Michael Les Benedict, A Compromise of 
Principle: Congressional Republicans and Reconstruction.
1863-1869 (New York, 1974).
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The Fourteenth Amendment had even greater significance. 
Developed in 1867 and eventually ratified by the requisite 
states in 1868, this amendment firmly established the 
congressional approach to Reconstruction. This legislation 
contained five sections. The first established that "All 
persons born or naturalized in the United States . . ., are 
citizens" of this country, and in turn served to grant the 
rights of citizenship to the freedmen within the South. It 
further prohibited any state from passing laws or acting in 
such a manner that would deprive any citizen of his 
constitutional rights under the law.25
The second section was specifically aimed at any state, 
particularly those in the South, that sought to deprive its 
citizens of the rights guaranteed to them under the 
amendment. The punishment for such an act was to reduce the 
offending state's representation in Congress in direct 
proportion to the number of individuals deprived of their 
rights as citizens. The third section was aimed at reducing 
President Johnson’s power to pardon former Confederates and 
restricted them from holding specified state or federal 
offices unless specifically pardoned by a vote of two-thirds 
of each house of Congress. This provision empowered Congress 
rather than the president with the authority to pardon former 
Confederates.
25 For a complete copy of the Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States see, Eric Foner and John A. 
Garraty, The Reader's Companion To American History (Boston, 
1991), 1197-1202.
The fourth section of the Amendment repudiated the 
Confederate war debts and declared that "neither the United 
States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or 
obligation incurred in aid of" the Confederacy or by "the 
loss of emancipation of any slave." These debts were 
declared invalid. The final section simply established that 
Congress had the "power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article." Not only did 
this final section provide Congress with the power to enforce 
this amendment, it also clearly placed Congress in control of 
Reconstruction. Congress's plan had been made a part of the 
Constitution and was therefore much more difficult for 
opponents both inside and outside of the Government to 
attack.
Perhaps the only weakness of the Congressional program, 
as specified in the Fourteenth Amendment, was the fact that 
Section 5, the enforcement clause, did not state how far 
Congress was willing to go in enforcing it. As was the 
custom then and now, the framers of the amendment merely 
assigned the enforcement responsibility to Congress. They 
did not attempt to specify within the document itself the 
steps Congress would or could take to insure compliance, any 
more than did the framers of the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, 
Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty-fourth or 
Twenty-fifth Amendments. As a result the decisions on 
enforcement were left to the determination of both the 
President and Congress as events dictated. The plan did not 
authorize Grant, or any one else, to use force, for instance,
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in insuring the law was obeyed. Instead it was necessary for 
the executive office to seek Congress's guidance and new laws 
if necessary to carry out any acts of enforcement. As time
passed this factor steadily increased in importance as the
make-up of Congress changed from election to election. 
Nevertheless, by applying pressure to the southern states 
that sought to return to "normal" relations with the Federal 
Government, the Fourteenth Amendment became law and was 
adopted in 1868 before Grant actually took office.
These then were the key elements of Congress 1 plan which
Grant had available for review. The Congressional plan had 
the most to offer to Grant. First, it was already in effect, 
and it did not necessarily require modification. Second, it 
was primarily a Republican party plan. For example, the 
House had passed the Fourteenth Amendment in June 1867 with 
unanimous Republican support and unified Democratic 
opposition.26 Third, the nation, by the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, appeared to support it. As the New 
York Times described the situation "Congress, sustained by 
the loyal States . . ., [was] master of the situation, and 
the South . . . [would] commit an irreparable blunder" if it 
were to "spurn the proffered terms of restoration."27 Thus, 
as the leader of the Republican party, Grant could have 
simply adopted Congress 1 current plan and openly supported it 
as his own. Yet, strangely enough, Grant elected not to 
follow that course of action. Nor did he elect to follow in
26 Foner, Reconstruction. 254.
27 New York Times, June 21, 1867, p. 4.
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the footsteps of either Lincoln or Johnson by adopting one of 
their plans of action or by attempting to establish his own 
blueprint for reconstruction. Instead, Grant chose a 
different course, derived from the lessons learned from his 
predecessors.
As Grant advised the nation in his eighth and final 
Annual Message, he determined that "the wrangling between 
Congress and the new Executive [President Johnson] as to the 
best mode of reconstruction," had "much embarrassed by the 
long delay" the task of reconstructing the nation. Grant, 
therefore, understood before taking office that conflict with 
the legislative branch of the government would not be 
conducive to an expeditious uniting of the North and South, a 
process that he felt "virtually commenced" with his 
inauguration. 28
Grant also understood that there was one common element 
to all three of the previous plans for Reconstruction. Each 
of them sought to rebuild a divided nation into one that was 
at peace with itself. Lincoln had sought by his plan to 
bring an end to the war by enticing the rebellious states 
back into the Union. Johnson had attempted to bring about 
peace by rapidly reuniting the states under a single 
government with a minimum of preconditions. Congress sought 
a peaceful national unity, but with the assurance that the 
South would be repentant for their transgressions and unable 
to resume resistance and that the freedmen would enjoy civil 
and political rights. The common element in each was the
28 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 400.
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desire to comply with the people's demand for an end to the 
conflict. By 1868, this desire had become the paramount 
issue and as the New York Times reported, "the whole country 
repeats the demand 'Let us have Peace.'" The Times 
considered "Grant’s election as the harbinger of peace."29 
None of these Reconstruction plans called for a continuation 
of conflict between the South and the Union. They did not 
lay out plans for how a President might at the point of a 
bayonet enforce a free and open election process or deal with 
rebellious activities. In addition the American people, 
while considering Reconstruction, spoke in favor of peace and 
prosperity, not of conflict and war. As a result of these 
understandings, he set a new course that would avoid conflict 
and bring peace to the nation.
29 New York Times, June 3, 1868, p. 4.
CHAPTER 4
GRANT’S PLAN FOR RECONSTRUCTION
On March 4, 1869, Ulysses S. Grant was inaugurated as 
President of the United States. The new President's 
inaugural address was neither spectacular nor long. He 
seemed to offer little information concerning his plan for 
the complex issues of Reconstruction.
In his speech, Grant advised that he had taken the oath 
of office "without mental reservation and with the 
determination to do to the best of . . . [his] ability all 
that" was required of him. Further, he declared that he 
would "commence his duties untrammeled" and that he would 
seek to work "to the satisfaction of the people."1 While 
these announcements appeared to offer little information to 
the listener, they were, in fact, important for they 
introduced to the nation Grant's plan for administering his 
office and resolving the issues that faced it. First, Grant 
assured his listeners that he would accept his 
responsibilities and try to do his best for the nation. 
Second, he told his audience that he had assumed an office 
which he had not sought and that he was not bound by 
political promises or preconceived notions of how things
1 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols., 
Washington, DC, 1896-1899), VII, 6.
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should be done. Third, in his own way, he informed the 
nation that his primary goal was to do those things which the 
majority of the American people favored, but he did not 
reveal how he would proceed.
Grant promised that he would "always express" his "views 
to Congress," that he might on occasion "exercise the 
constitutional privilege of interposing a veto to defeat 
measures" he felt obligated to oppose, and that he would 
"faithfully" execute all laws "whether they . . . [met his] 
approval or not."2 These statements are critical to 
understanding Grant's plan for his presidency. He 
established that while he would play an active role in 
overseeing the nation's progress, his opinion would not 
decide all issues. Instead, standing law and the demands of 
the people would be decisive. These statements demonstrated 
that Grant would not follow Johnson's path by insisting on 
his preferences and rejecting out of hand the will of 
Congress and the people. As to formalized written plans or 
goals, Grant, unlike Lincoln or Johnson before him, had none 
to offer on the subject of Reconstruction. Grant advised the 
nation that he would "on all subjects have a policy to 
recommend, but none to enforce against the will of the 
people."3 He did not, however, lay before the nation a 
program of his own making nor did he advocate the adoption of 
any currently before it in his first address to the American 
people. By declining to formulate a proposal, Grant avoided
2 Ibid., 6.
3 Ibid.
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being challenged by any faction on the issues of 
Reconstruction.
This in itself was no easy task. Not only were there 
the discontented Southerners who had supported President 
Johnson’s attempts to bring the South back into the Union at 
a minimum cost to themselves, there was also a wide variety 
of other factions present in the nation. There were, for 
instance, the Radical Republicans who were committed to 
bringing about vast changes in the South. For the most part 
they believed that governments could not legally abridge the 
natural rights— those of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness,"— of either white or black men. They also argued 
that guaranteeing fair and equal treatment of the former 
slaves under the laws of the land, common and criminal, was 
essential to their protection. Further, they advocated the 
granting of suffrage to black Americans in the belief that 
this was the only way political self-protection was possible. 
But this mind set of equality did not necessarily extend to 
American social life. There, the Radical Republicans were 
more cautious and attempted to assure northern and southern 
whites that they did not seek to place the black American on 
an equal footing in the realm of social relationships between 
the races. In addition, the Radical Republicans believed 
that the Federal Government was not only responsible for 
making these changes but had the power to do so as well. Led 
by such men as Senators Charles Sumner, Ben Wade, and Henry 
Wilson and Representatives Thaddeus Stevens, George W. Julian 
and James M. Ashley, they had battled President Johnson over
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Reconstruction and they and their followers were prepared to 
continue the conflict with Grant if n e c e s s a r y .4
There were also the Moderate Republicans, led by men 
such as Senators Lyman Trumbull and John Sherman and 
Representatives James G. Blaine and John A. Bingham, who were 
not willing to completely support their more radical 
colleagues. They sought to steer a more moderate course, one 
which would allow the South back into the Union but only if 
the new state governments were loyal to the nation and 
followed the principles of free labor in the South. Unlike 
their radical counterparts, they had initially attempted to 
work with President Johnson's plans for Reconstruction and to 
modify them as needed. Even more important, they were not 
totally convinced that black suffrage was a desirable goal to 
be pursued by their party. Rather, they looked upon it as an 
issue which weakened their case with both Northern and 
Southern whites. On this point they differed significantly 
from the more vocal radicals. They also did not share the 
radical belief in the enhanced powers of the Federal 
Government. Instead they maintained their more conservative 
views on the "legitimate rights of the states" and a limited 
central government. Thus they did not believe that, as a 
result of the war, the government should be entitled to 
interfere in local affairs or give away land to the Freedmen.5 
There were, of course, the northern Democrats who as 
members of that national party had opposed Grant and the
4 Eric Foner, Reconstruction; America's Unfinished 
Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 228-39.
5 Ibid., 241-46.
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Republicans in the election of 1868 by running New York 
Governor Horatio Seymour. In that campaign they had argued 
against the opposition's Reconstruction program and raised 
the issue of race to defeat their opponents. They attempted 
to show that the Republican policies would place the South 
under the domination of black Americans and create a general 
intermixing of the races. But their position fared badly at 
the polls in 1868.6
Finally, there were many Northerners who simply wanted 
peace, an end to the conflict and a return to more normal 
times. This group, although relatively silent, was of 
critical importance to the President and Reconstruction. If 
Grant and his party alienated them, the President would 
encounter severe political difficulty. Without their votes 
the Republicans ran the risk of losing elections and the 
opportunity to make the changes they desired.
One final group, around whom most of the controversy 
swirled, were the Freedmen themselves. They sought to 
protect their newly-won freedom and hoped to carve out a 
niche in the "new" Southern economy. They called upon the 
government to protect their rights and to provide them with 
the resources they needed to lead productive lives.i
Given these divergent and often contradictory factions 
and viewpoints, it was difficult to present a speech or 
program which met everyone's needs and did not offend 
someone. Despite his limited skills and almost non-existent
e Ibid., 338-41.
7 Ibid., 346-411.
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political background, Grant attempted to do just that, to 
establish a flexible but unwritten plan that would meet the 
nation's requirements and this remained his consistent policy 
throughout his presidency.
Grant informed the nation that it would be "desirable" 
for them to approach the issues arising from the rebellion 
"calmly, without prejudice, hate, or sectional pride, 
remembering that the greatest good to the greatest number 
. . . [was] the object to be obtained."8 Although Grant did 
not tell the nation his specific plans, he hoped to resolve 
matters peacefully. Although flexible concerning the means 
or process, Grant clearly had as an ultimate objective 
"peace" and national harmony.
Only at the end of his speech did Grant address the 
crucial issue of suffrage. He deemed it "very desirable that 
this question should be settled" by "the ratification of the 
fifteenth article of amendment to the Constitution."9 This 
amendment (passed by Congress on February 26, 1869) 
prohibited the federal or state governments from denying a 
male citizen the right to vote "on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude." The adoption of this 
amendment, which was clearly a key element of Congress’ 
expanding Reconstruction program, was the only legislation 
that Grant mentioned specifically and supported directly in 
his first inaugural address to the nation. By recommending 
it to the nation, Grant added his prestige to those who
s Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 6. 
9 Ibid., 8.
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desired its passage, without seriously committing himself to 
the overall plan of congressional Reconstruction.
Grant's position on the Fifteenth Amendment did not 
represent a dramatic change in his viewpoint toward black 
Americans. Even though Grant and his wife Julia had owned 
slaves before the war, this did not prevent him from 
perceiving the need to provide freedmen assistance during and 
after the war. As early as the fall of 1862, while Grant was 
waging his campaign against Vicksburg, he paused to aid the 
freed slaves in Mississippi. Confronted with "an army of 
them, all ages and both sexes," and prevented by "humanity" 
from "allowing them to starve," Grant sought ways to extend 
relief. Under the outstanding leadership of Chaplain John 
Eaton, Grant helped set up a program which hired the slaves 
out to plantation owners and the government to pick cotton 
and they "together fixed the prices to be paid for the Negro 
labor." Although the money for the work was not turned 
directly over to the Freedmen, it "was expended judiciously 
and for their benefit." According to Grant, this program and 
one other involving the cutting of wood along the Mississippi 
for use by steamers were extremely beneficial to both sides. 
Not only did it solve his problem of dealing with a flood of 
freedmen who needed assistance and prevented his army from 
moving freely, it enabled the blacks to become "self- 
sustaining" and provided them with "many comforts they had 
never known before."io
10 E. B. Long, ed., Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New 
York, 1952; Reprint, 1982), 221.
Later, as the war progressed, Grant moved to support not 
only emancipation but the active recruitment of black 
Americans into the Union army.n When the details of the 
massacre of black Union troops at Fort Pillow on April 12, 
1864, became known, Grant condemned these atrocities and 
supported the administration's decision to halt prisoner 
exchanges. Since the Confederacy did not consider black 
troops on an equal footing with white soldiers, Grant 
recommended suspending the exchanges until this situation was 
corrected.12 Although each of these measures aided the Union 
cause by depriving the enemy of manpower or increasing the 
number of Union men in the field, the actions simultaneously
aided the blacks in their quest for freedom. Therefore,
Grant's support of the Fifteenth Amendment was a natural step 
for both aiding the freedmen and at the same time seeking to
resolve a point of contention in the nation.
With a call for "patient forbearance one toward another 
throughout the land," Grant concluded his speech and avoided 
tying himself to any one plan, save for his stand on the 
Fifteenth Amendment. 13 He had adroitly left his options open 
and was therefore able to pursue a flexible program to meet 
the stated needs of the people. Grant had also avoided 
challenging Congress’ power to govern and had made no lasting 
enemies.
11 Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S.
Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction. 1861-1868 
(Chapel Hill, 1991), 35-46.
12 Ibid., 58-59.
13 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 8.
This short and relatively vague speech in actuality 
contained all of the key elements of Grant's plan for dealing 
with Congress, the American people and the issues of 
Reconstruction. Grant had promised to seek guidance from 
both the American people and Congress as to a preferred 
course based on the laws already enacted or forthcoming.
Grant implied that the American people and Congress would be 
responsible for the legislation enacted and subsequently 
enforced within the nation. By taking this stance, Grant 
indicated that he would work within the parameters 
established jointly by Congress and its constituents.
Together with this assurance, Grant advised that it would be 
his job to enforce all of the laws regardless of his personal 
views. He would enforce both good and bad laws to the best 
of his ability, thereby demonstrating their strengths and 
weaknesses and allowing Congress to respond accordingly.
Grant also indicated that he would recommend legislation 
for Congressional consideration, but he would not advocate 
nor demand that these acts be adopted. This approach was 
devised to avoid the kind of conflict with Congress which 
both Lincoln and Johnson had experienced. Certainly,
Congress should not find severe fault with such a 
recommendation, when they had previously been forced to 
respond to Lincoln's and Johnson's specific and detailed 
plans of action. By taking this approach, Grant could 
address an issue without risking a severe defeat or 
rejection. This flexible and deferential approach became a 
trademark of Grant's administration. Finally, Grant sought
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to capitalize on the nation’s desire for peace. Having 
viewed the horrors of war and the devastation that it caused, 
he consistently reminded the electorate that peace was 
possible through forbearance in dealing with others and 
compliance with all the laws of the land.
These then were the key elements of the unwritten plan 
with which Grant sought to avoid conflict with Congress and 
bring peace to the troubled Union. Grant elected to guide 
the nation through Reconstruction by adopting a flexible 
approach and without making a permanent commitment to a 
specific published plan. He hoped to rely on the nation and 
Congress to prescribe a legislative plan which he as 
president would enforce. In this manner, Grant could play 
the role of advisor and law enforcer but not premier national 
legislator.
Despite the brevity of his approach, as outlined in his 
inaugural address, the American people recognized Grant's 
program. An editorial in the New York Tribune, of March 5, 
1869, demonstrated this point by restating each plank of 
Grant's unwritten plan for reconstructing the nation. The 
editor argued that "those who doubt the man's statesmanship 
should analyze his brief speech, and see whether he . . . 
left anything unsaid." They divided the speech into a total 
of 13 points for the readers' consideration, of which four 
bear directly upon Grant's Reconstruction program. In the 
first point, the paper noted that he promised to "advise 
Congress— but not war upon it," a critical element of 
avoiding Johnson's unhappy fate. Next, the Tribune
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understood that Grant had stated that his "business . . .
[was] to execute the laws" of the nation as President, rather 
than seek new legislation. The editors also found that he 
had brought forth the key plank of his presidential campaign 
in that the nation had fought a war and that now it "must 
have peace." Finally they caught the tone of his promise to 
the Freedmen by noting that "as for the Negro,— equal rights 
in all the States."14 This editorial clearly demonstrated 
that Grant had been successful in expressing his plans for 
his presidency and Reconstruction, and that the nation had 
not missed his meaning. It also demonstrated that others 
applauded his strategy.
Initially, it might have been assumed that Grant was 
merely buying time in order to develop more specific plans 
for presentation at a later date, but this was not the case. 
Not once, in all his speeches and proclamations on 
Reconstruction, did he seek to present his own all- 
encompassing plan and then advocate its adoption. During the 
eight years of his administration, Grant on only one occasion 
personally broke away from Congress' leadership and advocated 
a specific item of legislation which he related to 
Reconstruction. In that one case, Congress rejected Grant’s 
plan.
Examples of Grant's determination to allow Congress to 
lead appeared regularly in his presentations to the nation.
In his first annual message of December 6, 1869, barely eight 
months after assuming office, he announced that the nation
14 New York Tribune, March 5, 1869, p. 8.
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was "blessed with peace at home" and therefore no 
exceptional actions were n e c e s s a r y . is while others might have 
claimed responsibility for this sudden and surprising 
success, Grant did not. Instead, he praised the legislators 
and noted that "the work of restoring State governments loyal 
to the Union" and "protecting and fostering free labor" had 
"received ample attention from Congress." In addition, he 
excused the legislative branch for not succeeding in all 
areas by arguing that although their efforts had "not met 
with the success in all particulars that might have been 
desired, yet on the whole" they had "been more successful 
than could have been reasonably anticipated."!6 In Grant's 
opinion Congress, as the leader in developing legislation to 
solve the ills of Reconstruction, had done a good job.
In fact, on December 6, 1869, Grant found little to 
criticize within the Reconstruction process. Not only did he 
praise Congress for its positive actions, he also lauded 
Southern freedmen. The President concluded that "under the 
protection which they have received" blacks were "making 
rapid progress in learning, and no complaints" were being 
received as to a "lack of industry on their part where they 
receive fair remuneration for their labor."17 All, according 
to Grant, was progressing satisfactorily as far as the 
nation's efforts to reunite itself were concerned and no 
recommendations seemed warranted.
is Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 27. 
ie Ibid., 28.
17 Ibid.
Turning to the enforcement of the nation's laws, Grant 
maintained his original position. In his second annual 
message of December 5, 1870, he proudly declared that his 
administration had seen to the "thorough enforcement of every 
law" passed by Congress.is Later, on December 4, 1871, the 
President announced that it was "gratifying to be able to 
state that during the past year success has generally 
attended the effort to execute all laws found upon the 
statute books." He added that his policy had not been "to 
inquire into the wisdom of laws already enacted, but to learn 
their spirit and intent and to enforce them accordingly."19 
Grant chose not to question the validity of the laws of the 
land, but rather to enforce them as he had promised from his 
first day in office, and he maintained these same primary 
beliefs throughout his presidency. In his final message to 
the people, he again reminded them that he had "acted in 
every instance from a conscientious desire to do what was 
right, constitutional within the law, and for the very best 
interests of the whole people." He also stated that the 
process of Reconstruction had been solely "the work of the 
legislative branch of government."2o
This then was Grant's administration program— to 
consistently maintain a flexible approach to Reconstruction 
without developing or adopting a specific written plan of 
action against which all of his actions could be compared. 
Further, Grant sought the advice of the American people and
is Ibid., 112.
19 Ibid., 142.
20 ibid., 400.
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recommended for Congress' consideration those actions which 
he felt might be appropriate to meet the needs of the nation. 
Once Congress passed legislation, Grant attempted to enforce 
it, without consideration of his personal beliefs concerning 
the benefits of the laws themselves. Finally, Grant 
continued throughout his administrations to advocate national 
peace and forbearance.
Included within this plan was Grant's clear indication 
that he would continue to support the Freedmen in their 
efforts to gain political rights and to become self 
sufficient. Grant's support of the Fifteenth Amendment was a 
logical continuation of his efforts during the war to aid 
black Americans, through emancipation, employment and 
recruitment into the army.
CHAPTER 5
GRANT'S COOPERATIVE PLAN SUCCEEDS
In the spring of 1869, Grant’s administration faced a 
wide variety of problems in dealing with the unresolved 
issues of Reconstruction. Foremost among these was bringing 
the remaining states, which had seceded in 1861, back into 
the Union. Even though Congress had readmitted seven former 
Confederate states during 1868, four more remained under 
military rule. Only Texas, Virginia, and Mississippi had 
failed to meet the requirements of Congress' Reconstruction 
program and in September 1867, they were joined by Georgia 
when that state expelled its black legislators. These four 
states still needed to complete the process dictated by the 
first and second Reconstruction Acts of 1867.
The first of these acts, after dividing the remaining 
former Confederate states into five military districts, 
required each state to hold a constitutional convention in 
order to reestablish their new civil government. The state's 
voters, whose ranks in accordance with the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment included black Americans and excluded 
certain classes of former rebels, were responsible for 
electing delegates to this convention. In turn these rebel- 
free representatives were to draft a new constitution that 
included a provision eliminating racial barriers to suffrage.
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Once this had been accomplished and the state ratified both 
its new constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
would seat the state's representatives.1
The second Reconstruction Act, which was passed when the 
South failed to act, provided a detailed set of instructions 
to the military on when the process was to start and how it 
was to be completed. As a result, the South acted and all 
but four states successfully completed the prescribed 
process.2
While Johnson might have demanded these states' 
readmission, Grant demanded nothing of Congress. Rather, as 
part of his unwritten plan, he called Congress' attention to 
this issue and then relied on them to resolve it. On April 
7, 1869, Grant suggested to Congress "that it . . . [was] 
desirable to restore the States which were engaged in the 
rebellion to their proper relations to the Government and the 
country." Thereafter, he recommended that the legislators 
take into consideration Virginia's attempts to return to the 
Union on an equitable basis. Grant advised that he was "led 
to make . . . [that] recommendation from the confident hope 
and belief that the people of that State . . . [were] now 
ready to cooperate" with the federal government.3 Grant, 
however, did not insist on congressional action nor prescribe
1 Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S.
Grant and the Politicis of War and Reconstruction. 1861-1868 
(Chapel Hill, 1991), 170-73.
2 ibid., 176.
3 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols,
Washington, DC, 1896-1899), VII, 11-12.
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a plan to be followed for the readmission of Virginia or any 
of the remaining former Confederate States still outside the 
Union.
In spite of the fact that Grant had not called for a 
specific action from Congress, his statements were received 
with appreciation by the New York Tribune. The newspaper 
declared in its editorial section that the President's 
message of April 7, 1869, was "eminently wise, judicious and 
timely." The editor was pleased with "the immediate effect" 
of his remarks and firmly believed that Congress would see to 
"the speedy return of Virginia and Mississippi to their 
natural relations to the Government."4
Throughout 1869, Grant maintained his position on this 
issue. As late as December 6, 1869, he continued to call 
upon Congress to rectify the situation, while noting his own 
efforts to bring about resolution. In his first annual 
message Grant explained that he had done all that Congress 
had asked in its joint resolution authorizing the "Executive 
to order elections in the States of Virginia, Mississippi, 
and Texas, to submit to them the constitutions . . . "  which 
each state had developed. Elections had been held in each of 
the three former Confederate states, and Grant sincerely 
hoped "that the acts of the legislatures of these states" 
would receive Congressional approval "and thus close the work 
of reconstruction."5 The New York Tribune continued to 
support the President's position. In an article dated
4 New York Tribune. April 8, 1869, p. 4.
5 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 29.
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December 7, 1869, the newspaper noted Grant's stance and 
called on Congress to "evince equal alacrity in complying 
with these . . . judicious recommendations6 Eventually, 
Congress acknowledged Grant's appeals by allowing the other 
Confederate states to return, the last being Georgia in July 
1870. In each case the state was admitted only after it had 
reorganized a new state government in accordance with 
provisions of the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and had 
ratified the Fifteenth Amendment.
Although it is true that the southern states were 
responding to Congress' conditions, Grant's low key approach 
had facilitated the situation. It placed firm and popularly 
supported pressure on Congress to end this divisive 
condition. It also allowed the remaining states to avoid 
being caught in a conflict between the two governmental 
branches, which in the past had helped delay their 
readmission. Grant’s support for their return had made the 
process easier and resolved not one but two issues in the 
Reconstruction process. By allowing Congress to take the 
lead and then pressuring them to act in a favorable manner, 
he had alleviated tension between his office and Congress.
And he achieved his desired objective, the peaceful return of 
the remaining four states.
The accomplishment of this goal was one of the few 
successes of Reconstruction, and it did not come at the 
expense of the freedmen themselves. Instead, the reunion of 
the former Confederate States with the national Union brought
e New York Tribune, December 7, 1869, p. 6.
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with it the adoption of both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments. These constitutional revisions sought to improve 
the condition of the former slaves and at the same time 
provide them with the right to vote. The unification process 
was also intended to establish a new civil government in 
which blacks could participate. These were positive attempts 
to meet their needs, although as time passed these goals were 
lost to the "redeemers'" intimidation and violence.
The ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment was another 
successful outcome of Grant's unwritten plan emphasizing 
cooperation with Congress. It took place on February 2,
1870. This measure, as proposed by Congress and ratified by 
the nation, extended the right of suffrage to black 
Americans. The Republicans believed that by its passage they 
had provided the freedmen with the tool necessary to protect 
themselves by voting for and possibly electing men to office 
who would safeguard their interests.? The President had 
announced his support for the amendment in his first 
inaugural address. Addressing the issue of suffrage, Grant 
found it very "desirable that this question should be 
settled" at once and he hoped that it would be resolved by 
the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.8 Its adoption 
promised to complete the congressional Reconstruction 
process.
As ratification seemed imminent, Grant quickly countered 
the impact of rumors that some states might repeal their
7 Eric Foner, Reconstruction; America's Unfinished 
Revolution. 1863-1877 (New York, 1988), 444-49.
8 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers, VII, 8.
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earlier ratification of the proposed amendment. On March 28, 
1870, the New York Tribune reported rumors in Washington that 
the Virginia legislature was "preparing to abrogate its 
ratification of the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment by a 
coup de main." But the paper learned that the President had 
already responded to these rumors by declaring that he would 
issue a "proclamation announcing the adoption of the 
Amendment as soon" as Texas ratified the amendment and was 
readmitted to the Union.9 By promptly taking this position, 
Grant signified that he favored the Amendment and would act 
to insure its passage.
As promised, on March 30, 1870, Grant notified Congress 
of the ratification of that amendment. In celebrating its 
passage, Grant announced that it made "at once 4,000,000 
people voters who were . . . [once] declared by the highest 
tribunal in the land not citizens of the United States" and 
it was "indeed a measure of grander importance than any" 
since "the founding of our free Government. "i° Again this 
support cost Grant nothing, since it was not a plan of his 
making and the necessary number of states had already made it 
law by ratifying it. This demonstration of Grant's approval 
of Congress' efforts to complete the rebuilding of the nation 
strengthened his positive working relationship with Congress 
and minimized possible conflicts.
Following his previous method of operation, Grant used 
this opportunity to "call upon Congress to take all means
9 New York Tribune. March 28, 1870, p. 1.
Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 55-56.
within their constitutional powers to promote and encourage 
popular education throughout the country" for everyone, 
including the freedmen. Grant hoped this would make everyone 
a better voter under the Fifteenth Amendment.n He once more 
recommended that Congress take action, without giving 
directions concerning either programs or funding. Nor did he 
define what he meant by an "education." Rather, he 
highlighted an area that would benefit from congressional 
actions, but he did not seek to intervene in the legislative 
process. It was Congress' responsibility either to bring the 
ideas to fruition or to ignore them.
Grant's call for Congress to consider expanding the 
educational opportunities for everyone, including blacks, was 
consistent with his frequently demonstrated desire to aid the 
freedmen. It followed from Grant's previous actions on their 
behalf during the war and his declarations of support for the 
passage of the final Reconstruction Amendment.
Grant’s cooperative working relationship with Congress 
also produced a positive joint effort in the handling of the 
Ku Klux Klan. Organized in Pulaski, Tennessee, in 1866, by 
Confederate veterans, this loosely structured secret 
organization made its presence known on the national level by 
1868. Klan members, often acting on their own decisions 
rather than those of their leaders, sought through violence 
and intimidation to influence the outcome of elections in
11 Ibid., 56.
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southern s t a t e s . 12 as time passed the organization spread to 
other states, until on August 28, 1869, James Abram Garfield, 
a staunch Radical Republican, warned southerners that if they 
persisted "in forming Ku Klux Klans in the South to murder 
Union men, white or black" that the North would "use the 
bayonet." Further, he declared that it was the government's 
intent to "see the rights, liberties and lives of Union men, 
white and black, protected." 15 clearly, declared the Tribune. 
the Klan "who scourges, robs, and sometimes kills, 
inoffensive Negroes" had captured national attention.14 By 
March 1870, Congress was in the process of investigating "the 
necessity of using the United States forces in maintaining 
order" in such states as Tennessee.15
Left to its own devices, Congress acted to restrain the 
activities of such violent pressure groups. In May 1870 it 
passed legislation commonly known as the "Enforcement Act" to 
help curtail discriminatory abuses in the election process. 
The bill prohibited state authorities from excluding voters 
based on race and authorized the President to investigate 
such abuses through the use of election administrators.
These individuals in turn were authorized to pursue the
i2 George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace; The Role of 
Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction (Athens, 1984), 
69-72. For additional information on the Klan see, Allen W. 
Trelease, White Terror; The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and 
Southern Reconstruction (New York, 1971).
15 Burke A. Hinsdale, ed. The Works of James Abram 
Garfield (2 vols., 1882; Reprint. Freeport, NY., 1970), I,
397.
14 New York Tribune. March 29, 1870, p. 4.
15 Ibid., March 25, 1870, p. 1.
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federal prosecution of persons committing election f r a u d .is 
The Klan took no notice of the new law, because no one within 
the Federal Government attempted to enforce it. This 
reluctance to act was based on a belief shared by Grant and 
many other key Republicans that the Federal authorities could 
only act after the State Governors had depleted their own 
resources in trying to resolve the crisis. Faced only with a 
threat of punishment, the Klan continued its violent ways.17
Despite Klan actions and the national response, Grant 
made no direct reference to them in his first inaugural 
address nor in his first annual message. When he did finally 
take note of their activities in his second annual message of 
December 5, 1870, he merely advised that it was "to be 
regretted . . . that a free exercise of the elective 
franchise" had been altered "by violence and intimidation" 
and that the right to vote had been "denied to citizens in 
exceptional cases in several of the States lately in 
rebellion."i0 But he proposed no new special legislation to 
resolve the problem. In typical fashion, he left the matter 
of a regulatory response to Congress.
When the Klan’s activities continued unabated, however, 
Grant did eventually take action under the legislation of May 
1870 to combat violence in the South. He first provided 
reports on these occurrences as requested by Congress. For 
example, on January 13, 1871, Grant forwarded extensive
16 Foner, Reconstruction. 454.
17 Trelease, White Terror. 215, 385.
i0 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 96.
reports from the War Department "relative to the outrages in 
North Carolina and . . . the other Southern States."is Then 
he provided additional information in a special message to 
Congress, dated March 23, 1871. In it he contended that "a 
condition of affairs . . . exist[ed] in some of the States of 
the Union rendering life and property insecure." The 
President believed that "the power [needed] to correct these 
evils" went well "beyond the control of the State 
authorities"; he was uncertain whether or not "acting within 
the limits of existing laws" he could control the situation 
by use of Federal authority. Therefore, Grant "urgently 
recommend[ed] such legislation as in the judgment of Congress 
shall eventually secure life, liberty, and property and the 
enforcement of the l a w . "20 as on previous occasions, Grant 
recommended that Congress act, but he did not tell them what 
he specifically wanted or needed to solve the crisis. It 
was, as usual, left to the legislators to find the answers to 
the questions posed by this crisis.
Congress acted quickly and passed the second enforcement 
act in April 1871. This law's provisions were stronger than 
those of the first act and were aimed specifically at groups 
like the Ku Klux Klan. The legislation declared that any 
acts by organizations bearing firearms, such as the Klan, 
could be defined by the President of the United States as 
rebellion and dealt with by federal military force. In 
addition it identified specific crimes which were punishable
is Ibid., 117. 
20 ibid., 127.
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under federal instead of state law. These crimes included 
conspiring to deprive individuals of their legal rights to 
vote, obtain public office, serve on juries, and be equally 
protected by the law. Grant was also authorized to use the 
military as necessary and to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus to help suppress the activities of such g r o u p s . 21
Congress, therefore, provided Grant with the specific laws 
that he felt he needed to enforce peace in the South and 
could exercise in accordance with his perception of the 
appropriate powers of the President. Armed with this new 
legislation, he did exactly that.
On May 3, 1871, Grant announced his intention to use 
this new law "to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth 
amendment of the Constitution of the United States." He 
called upon "all good citizens, and especially upon all 
public officers, to be zealous in the enforcement" of this 
new legislation. He warned insurgents "to abstain from 
committing any of the acts" precluded by its provisions.
Grant also told the nation that the failure of both the 
people and the state governments to resolve the crisis 
created by rebellious individuals would impose upon the 
federal government "the duty of putting forth all its 
energies for the protection of its citizens of every race and 
color and for the restoration of peace and order throughout 
the entire country. "22
21 Foner, Reconstruction. 455.
22 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 134-35.
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Speeches alone did not curb the acts of violence and 
intimidation, and Grant acted accordingly. After issuing yet 
another warning proclamation on October 12, 1871, which 
identified nine counties in South Carolina as being in a 
state of rebellion, Grant suspended the writ of habeas corpus 
in these counties on October 17, 1871. Federal marshals and 
the military under orders from Grant and armed with this new 
authority promptly moved against the insurgents and their 
armed organizations.23 Grant had proceeded only after 
Congress had taken the initiative by providing him with new 
legislation which he could enforce.
In this case Grant's operational plan was successful.
As the President reported in his third annual message to the 
nation on December 4, 1871, he had used "the act of Congress 
approved on April 20, 1871, and commonly known as the Ku-Klux 
law" to defeat that organization in South Carolina. Grant 
claimed that individuals presumed to be "members of such 
unlawful combinations" had been arrested. Approximately 168 
alleged criminals were, according to the President, delivered 
to the authorities in the counties of York and S p a r t a n b u r g .24 
Grant further alleged that once "it appeared that the 
authorities of the United States were about to take vigorous 
measures to enforce the law" others who had participated in 
the rebellious activities had fled to avoid p r o s e c u t i o n .25
23 ibid., 137.
24 ibid., 150-51.
25 ibid., 151.
Although Grant acknowledged that the affairs within the 
South were "unhappily, not such as all true patriotic 
citizens would like to see," he seemed satisfied with the 
results and refrained from calling for further legislation. 
Instead, Grant reflected on his vision of a happier future, 
"when the old citizens" of the South would "take an interest 
in public affairs, . . . vote for men representing their 
views, and tolerate the same freedom of expression and 
ballot" for those who held opposing positions. By the time 
of the 1872 presidential election, federal military troops 
and marshals had broken the Klan’s power.26 Unfortunately for 
the nation, Grant's vision regarding a happier time did not 
materialize.
The President's unwritten strategy was successful in 
dealing with insurgents in the South. Grant had called upon 
Congress for legislation, without specifying what he wanted 
or needed. Upon receiving the empowering legislation, he 
proved willing and able to enforce the laws in the South. 
Grant's simple, unpublished plan to suggest but not demand, 
to encourage Congress to look at certain problems and to 
solve them, worked well in his first term as President. It 
helped him maintain a reasonable working relationship with 
Congress and a general peace in the nation. As Grant's 
presidency progressed through the first four years, the 
President retained his original methodology of dealing with 
Congress and the nation. To have done otherwise would have
26 Trelease, White Terror, 399-418; see also, Foner, 
Reconstruction. 457-59.
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required him to reverse course in conflict with his 
fundamental persona.
This is not to contend that Grant's plan and 
administration did not encounter resistance from other groups 
within the country. It had of course drawn attacks from the 
Democratic party, which resisted his actions while minimizing 
or ignoring the unlawful acts of such groups as the K l a n . 27 
Grant had also drawn resistance from within his own political 
organization, and fractures in party unity appeared during 
his first administration.
One such break occurred when Senator Charles Sumner from 
Massachusetts, a Radical Republican, came to resist Grant's 
actions and then supported his opponent in the presidential 
election of 1872. Sumner in 1870 authored the Civil Rights 
Bill, which proposed guaranteeing the freedmen equal access 
to public transportation, room accommodations, common 
carriers, churches, public schools, and jury service. Sumner 
argued that the passage of this bill would have insured that 
the nation lived up to the promises made to black Americans. 
This legislation repeatedly failed passage. It met 
resistance from many diverse sectors, including members of 
the GOP. In part, Sumner blamed Grant for this failure 
because he felt the President could have forced the bill 
through Congress. As a result, he turned from Grant and 
endorsed Horace Greeley, another former Republican who had 
also broken with the President. In so doing the senator
27 Trelease, White Terror. 389-96.
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helped fragment Republican ranks and disrupted Grant's 
pursuit of total party unity.
Horace Greeley, the owner and editor of the New York 
Tribune. had broken with the President in 1871 over the need 
for a quick end to Reconstruction and chose to run against 
him in the 1872 election. Greeley's defection was a severe 
blow to Grant in that he not only faced a member of his own 
party in the election but also lost the support of an 
influential Republican newspaper. In turn, the Democrats, 
recognizing that they could not run their own candidate with 
any hope of beating Grant, threw their support behind Greeley 
as well. As the campaign developed, Greeley ran on a 
platform which advocated a return to local home rule, amnesty 
for the former rebels, and civil service reform. He also 
called upon the people to forget the tragedy of the war and 
forgive their enemies so that Republican Reconstruction could 
be brought to an end.28 This forced Grant to fight a campaign 
on two fronts, one against breakaway Republicans and the 
other against the Democratic party.
Grant's plan of minimizing resistance and allowing 
others to recommend and lead paid off in this situation. 
Supporters, such as the New York Times, who agreed with his 
desire for peace and the reduction of political conflict, 
rallied to his cause and fought back throughout 1872. When 
the attacks became tiresome, this newspaper attempted to 
divert attention from the more substantive issues by 
searching for the source of the "intense animosity" toward
28 Foner, Reconstruction. 502-3.
Grant and argued that the real problem was not the President 
but his inability to award favors to demanding office 
seekers. According to the newspaper's editorial of March 21, 
1872, "the curse of the Presidential office" could be found 
in the necessity of distributing offices to those who sought 
them and the fact that there were "many places to give away, 
and there . . . [were] about ten times as many applicants as 
. . . places." Thus Grant, declared the New York Times. was 
the victim of greedy and demanding office seekers who saw the 
lucrative positions go to others and retaliated by attacking
the P r e s i d e n t .29 while this may indeed have been one of many
problems faced by Grant, it was not the most critical. The 
Democrats were proposing nothing less than an end to 
Reconstruction and an abandonment of Republican policies.
This was the real issue that challenged Grant's abilities.
Six days later, this same newspaper continued its 
defense of Grant by first comparing his actions as President 
to the promises of the Republican party and then declaring 
that his administration had "been, in a marked degree, in 
complete harmony with the pledges of the Republican Party, 
and with what the people expected of it." In April, the New 
York Times argued that the "renomination of Gen. Grant . . . 
[was] insisted upon, not by him, but by at least the majority 
of those who first nominated and then elected him." The 
editorial argued that this majority believed "that although 
all of his acts . . . [had] not met with unqualified approval
29 New York Times, March 21, 1872, p. 4.
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of his supporters," Grant had still "administered the affairs 
of his office faithfully, and on the whole wisely and well."3o
These defenses of Grant provide evidence that he had, 
through his unwritten plan, managed to convey his own basic 
goals to others without alienating such powerful supporters 
as the New York Times. Although his actions did generate 
opposition, at times from breakaway members of his own party, 
they did not create the overwhelming resistance that 
Johnson's had between 1865 and 1868. Instead of facing 
impeachment as had Johnson in his final year of office, Grant 
received the presidential nomination of his party in 1872.
Grant and the Republican party were not content simply 
to exchange barbs through the newspapers. Instead, Grant 
sought to improve his position by supporting Congress' 
attempts to pass the Amnesty Act of 1872. It proposed the 
removal of the disabilities imposed on former Confederates by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. This legislation had in a similar 
format been first proposed in 1870 and again in 1871, but 
like the Civil Rights Act it failed to pass. The New York 
Tribune, one of Grant's detractors, had argued as early as 
April 8, 1869, for an end to the "odious policy of 
disfranchisement" and recommended that the former Confederate 
States' political institutions rest "upon the broadest, and 
therefore, the safest, basis of suffrage."3i Both the 
Democrats and Greeley's supporters continuously argued for
30 ibid., April 9, 1872, p. 4.
31 New York Tribune. April 8, 1869, p. 4.
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the passage of an amnesty act to end disenfranchisement, 
which they believed divided the nation along sectional lines.
On December 4, 1871, Grant stole their thunder by 
throwing his support behind this legislation. In his third 
annual message to the nation he advised that "more than six 
years . . . [had] elapsed since the last hostile gun was 
fired between the armies" and that it therefore was an 
appropriate time to consider whether "the disabilities 
imposed by the fourteenth amendment should be removed."
Grant went on to argue that no additional benefits would be 
gained by continuing to exclude anyone, with the possible 
exception of "any great criminals," from e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t .32 
He recommended the matter for Congress' careful 
consideration, and in so doing signified his support for the 
proposal; in the name of good will and peaceful coexistence 
he had removed this issue from the opposition's arsenal. The 
New York Times promptly backed the President and argued on 
December 9, 1871, that there was much to support the removal 
"of those disabilities which experience . . . [had] proved .
. . a mistake to impose." The newspaper followed the same 
line of reasoning by pointing out that once they were 
enfranchised the former Confederates "would . . . turn their 
entire attention to the work of honest and effective 
government, to the maintenance of order . . ., and the 
promotion of local industry and commerce."33 The Amnesty Act 
became law in 1872.
32 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 153.
33 New York Times. December 9, 1871, p. 4.
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Grant's unwritten plan of quiet recommendation had again 
proven successful by defusing a dangerous issue.
Grant defeated the opposing candidate, Horace Greeley, 
in 1872 by a popular majority of 3,597,132 to 2,834,125. In 
the South, according to Eric Foner, the election "outcome 
reflected the loyalty of the black electorate, a 
stabilization of scalawag support, and the fact that a number 
of Democrats, unable to stomach Greeley, remained at home."
In the North, Grant carried every state, and only in 
Massachusetts did significant voter defections take p l a c e . 34 
In researching this election, historian William S. McFeely 
found that the effectiveness of the opposition was limited 
because "Grant could hold the vote of Midwestern farmer 
. . ., the vote of the freedmen . . . and he could hold the 
vote of the soldier he had led into battle." McFeely also 
noted that Grant "the warrior stood for peace and for order" 
and that he represented safety and dependability to the 
p e o p l e . 35 Although part of his victory can be attributed to 
his hero status, much of it must be assigned to Grant's 
choice of methods. It was Grant's plan after all to insure 
"peace and order" in the nation and to provide the nation 
with safety and dependability. As a result, he had avoided 
radical programs which generated opposition in Congress and 
had acted to decrease the tensions between the North and 
South. He had supported those programs which were developed 
and supported by Congress and sought to enforce federal laws
34 Foner, Reconstruction. 508-10.
33 William S. McFeely, Grant; A Biography (New York, 
1982), 383.
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to the best of his ability. His continuing popularity and 
reelection to a second term appeared to vindicate his choice 
of methods. The New York Times. which had for the most part 
supported Grant throughout his first four years, calmly 
notified the people upon his election for a second term that 
they "could hardly have a safer man at the helm in calm or 
stormy times. "36
He had accomplished much. In 1868 four states remained 
outside of their normal relationship with the Union. In 1873 
all of the former Confederate states had been returned to the 
Union. In 1868 Congress had been at war with the President 
and the office seemed in great danger. In 1873 the President 
and Congress worked together with the executive suggesting 
action, and the legislature passing the necessary laws. In 
1868 sectional conflicts pulled at the nation's unity, and 
disaster threatened its security. In 1873 the nation seemed 
secure from the threat of civil war and the activities of 
such rebellious organizations as the Klan. In 1867 most 
black Americans in the North and South, as well as many white 
Americans in the South, could not vote. By 1873 the
Fifteenth Amendment had been adopted. The Amnesty Act of
1872 had removed the last restrictions from former rebels. 
Although it can be argued that Grant's plans had not solved 
all of the problems of the nation nor even guaranteed that 
the laws passed would be obeyed, the American people had 
responded favorably and returned him to Washington. His 
margin of victory, which comprised over 55 percent of the
36 New York Times, March 4, 1873, p. 4.
ballots cast, represented the largest majority since the 
election of Andrew Jackson in 1832. Grant's unwritten 
program for conflict avoidance and peace seemed to have 
worked well.
CHAPTER 6
GRANT'S COOPERATIVE PLAN FALTERS
Grant's planned course of action for dealing with 
Congress and the nation, although relatively successful for 
the first four years, was not foolproof. The weakness of 
this course of action was that Grant had offered very little 
in the way of guidance to the nation. As the captain of the 
ship of state, he had left it up to the crew (Congress), and 
the passengers (the American people), to decide the ship's 
final course. A captainless ship could run aground.
Yet another enemy of Grant's plan was time itself. As 
long as loyal and sympathetic Republicans maintained control 
of Congress and the people remained interested in 
Reconstruction, his plan could work. But, if with the 
passage of time the Republicans lost control over Congress or 
key Republicans like Sumner and Greeley continued to abandon 
Grant or the people themselves grew tired of Reconstruction, 
the Republican program of rebuilding the nation might falter 
without executive leadership. This latter hazard offered the 
greatest threat to the continued operation of the cooperative 
relationship between Grant and Congress. If the American 
people lost interest in the burdensome issues of race and 
Reconstruction, then Grant's administration would be cast 
adrift without the people's guidance.
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On December 2, 1872, Grant claimed that disorder in the 
South had been greatly reduced. The president predicted the 
complete suppression of "combinations" prohibited by the 
enforcement acts in the near future, "when the obvious 
advantages of good order and peace" would prevail.i But the 
time of which Grant spoke never arrived.
The reasons for this failure were clear. Grant had 
overestimated the strength of his position, which steadily 
eroded over the next four years. The forces weakening his 
authority included economic disaster, accusations of 
corruption, the determined intervention of the opponents of 
Republican Reconstruction, and the general weariness of the 
American people in the face of rapid social change. To these 
was added the growing opposition from within his own party.2 
in each case Grant's course of action faltered, and the 
administration drifted without congressional leadership.
This is not to say that Grant did not attempt to head 
off his opposition and to mend political fences, for in fact 
he made significant attempts to do just that. But they did 
not work. For example, when Sumner broke with the President 
prior to the election of 1872, Grant understood the basis of 
this fracture was, in part, his failure to push through 
Sumner's Civil Rights Bill. Although Grant had offered his
1 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents. 1789-1897 (10 vols., 
Washington, DC, 1896-1899),VII, 99.
2 Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace; Ulysses S. 
Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction. 1861-1868 
(Chapel Hill, 1991), 252-54. See also, Eric Foner, 
Reconstruction; America's Unfinished Revolution. 1863-1877
(New York, 1988), 512-63.
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support and made it known through the newspapers "that he 
sympathized fully with the [freedmen's] desire to obtain the 
rights of citizens" and "that all citizens should be equal," 
he still needed to win men like Sumner over to his c a m p . 3 in 
an attempt to remedy this deficiency, Grant in his second 
inaugural address, threw his support behind the premise of 
the Civil Rights Bill, if not the bill itself.
In his address, delivered in March 1873, he noted that 
although "the effects of the late strife . . . [had] been to 
free the slave and make him a citizen," the freedmen still 
did not possess "the civil rights which citizenship should 
carry with it." Grant declared that this situation was 
"wrong, and should be corrected" and that he stood 
"committed, so far as Executive influence . . . [could] 
avail" to accomplishing that task. He called upon the nation 
to give the freedman only what he deserved, "a fair chance to 
develop what there . . . [was] good in him, give him access 
to the schools" and when he traveled to grant him the 
assurance that only his actions would "regulate the treatment 
and fare" that he received.4
As he had so many times before, Grant elected to 
advocate a position but did not demand the passage of 
Sumner’s specific Civil Rights Bill or any other for that 
matter. Instead, he called upon the nation as a whole to 
grant the freedmen the opportunity to enjoy their rights as 
citizens without interference and asked for the legislation 
to accomplish this. This message elicited a mixed response.
3 New York Times. November 27, 1872, p. 1.
4 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 221.
The New York Times, his standard bearer, congratulated the 
President on his "blunt, straight-forward, and practical" 
address, noted Grant's opinions on the Civil Rights issue, 
and declared that it was "safe to conclude that all" 
available "Executive influence" would be applied "to 
accomplish this object."5 Others, such as the delegates from 
the National Civil Rights Convention of 1873, called on the 
President to thank "him for his continued friendship" to the 
freedmen and "his recommendation to Congress to secure for 
them the civil rights of which they" were d e n i e d . 6 Even 
though Grant maintained this position on this question for 
the balance of his administration, it had limited positive 
results. Sumner maintained his opposition to Grant's 
administration until his death in March 1874, and it was not 
until 1875 that Congress finally passed a version of Sumner's 
Civil Rights Act. Grant had been unable to accommodate 
either his opposition or to insure the prompt passage of the 
desired legislation. This was in fact one of the more 
significant signs that Grant's cooperative program with 
Congress was no longer effective. Congress had not done as
Grant recommended, and the disagreements and strife over the
Civil Rights Bill continued for over two years after Grant 
cast his support behind the measure.7
Grant's support of the Civil Rights bill is another 
typical example of his refusal to abandon what he had decided
s New York Times. March 5, 1873, p. 4.
6 Ibid., December 13, 1873, p. 1.
7 Foner, Reconstruction. 504-5, 553-56. See also, David 
Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man (New York,
1970), 531-47, 579-80, 586-87.
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to support. Even though Grant could have forsaken this 
legislation developed for the benefit of black Americans, he 
did not turn back. He had announced his support and he 
continued to offer his presidential prestige to bolster the 
act in the face of opposition which successfully delayed its 
passage for some five years and minimized its effectiveness.
But in spite of such failures, Grant retained his 
unwritten plan. As early as February 25, 1873, even before 
his second inauguration, he utilized this approach once again 
when he respectfully called Congress' attention to the 
election abuses of the southern Democrats and White League in 
the State of Louisiana. As he described it, there had been 
"an organized attempt on the part of those controlling the 
election officers and returns to defeat . . . the will of the 
majority of the electors of the State" in the 1872 
presidential elections. On his own authority and in 
accordance with the provisions of the law passed on May 31, 
1870, "entitled 'An act to enforce the right of citizens of 
the United States to vote in the several States of the 
Union,'" Grant had ordered the United States marshal to 
intervene and to use troops if necessary. The result was 
that "a full set of State officers had been installed and a 
legislative assembly organized, constituting, if not a de 
jure, at least a de facto government." Grant, however, 
acknowledged that this "de facto government", was still 
confronted by a second group of people who also claimed to be 
the state government. And he conceded that an investigation 
of the election irregularities had revealed "so many frauds
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and forgeries as to make it doubtful what candidates received 
a majority of the votes actually cast. "8 Yet, with all of 
these difficulties so clearly documented and placed before 
Congress, Grant offered no new solutions or plans. Indeed, 
he told the legislators that he had "no specific 
recommendations to make upon the subject" at hand. Instead, 
he urged Congress to devise "any practical way of removing 
these difficulties by legislation." If Congress chose not to 
act, Grant advised that despite his anxiety "to avoid any 
appearance of undue interference in State affairs" he would 
continue to support the state government that he had 
recognized and helped establish.9
Although Grant proclaimed in his second inaugural 
address of March 4, 1873, that he had sought "to maintain all 
laws" and "to act in the best interests of the whole people" 
during his first administration and promised to do so in his 
second term, the task became much more difficult to 
accomplish.io By May 1873, he was again forced to direct 
"turbulent and disorderly persons [Democrats and armed groups 
of white natives in the State of Louisiana] to disperse and 
retire peaceably" to their homes and to obey the law.n With 
Grant's presidential support and the efforts of Republicans 
in Louisiana, the opposition forces were repulsed
8 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 212-13.
9 Ibid., 213.
10 ibid., 221.
11 Ibid., 224.
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temporarily. 12 it is important to note that on this occasion 
Congress passed no new laws to help curb this "turbulent" 
opposition. Grant was left to his own devices as Congress 
failed to place new and more powerful laws on the books. The 
inherent danger of Grant's plan now became apparent. If 
Congress could not or would not think of new ways to prop up 
Grant's administration by additional legislation and the 
President's proclamations no longer commanded respect, then 
the nation had no Reconstruction policy to enforce.
The crisis of 1873 and the ensuing depression further 
complicated Grant's situation. This depression diverted the 
attentions of both the government and the people from the 
pressing issues of Reconstruction. The impact was felt 
particularly in the North, where Reconstruction became a 
southern problem to be tabled in deference to economic 
issues .13
The changing composition of Congress compounded the 
problems of depression. In 1870, with all of the former 
Confederate states able to send representatives to Congress, 
the makeup of that organization began to change. More and 
more southern Democrats added their votes to opponents of 
Reconstruction in the North, and Grant found Congress much 
less cooperative. By 1874, the Democrats had won control of 
the House of Representatives, turning a dominant Republican 
majority into a stubborn Democratic one. Even though the 
Republicans continued their control of the Senate, the
12 George C. Rable, But There Was No Peace; The Role of 
Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction (Athens, Ga.,
1984),122-143.
13 Foner, Reconstruction. 512-534.
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Republican Congress of Grant's first term no longer existed. 
After 1874, when Grant went to Congress for guidance in 
accordance with his flexible plan, the response he received 
was no longer as helpful as it had been under a Congress 
controlled by Republicans.14
Moreover, by 1873 the desire to confront the former 
Confederacy had subsided. During the election campaigns of 
1872, Liberal Republicans had called for reconciliation with 
the South and an end to Reconstruction as practiced by 
Grant's administration. These arguments had found an 
increasingly sympathetic public ear.15 Grant, as he delivered 
his fifth annual message on December 1, 1873, acknowledged 
this fact by again recommending to Congress the adoption of 
an all-encompassing "general amnesty program" toward those 
who were still prevented from participating fully in the 
political process. According to Grant, the number of rebels 
still excluded was "very small, but enough to keep up a 
constant irritation" and "no possible danger . . . [could] 
accrue to the Government by restoring them to eligibility to 
hold office."15 Congress responded positively to this 
recommendation by adopting a program of general amnesty.
Yet, when Grant suggested in December 1873 that Congress 
consider passage of legislation to "better secure the civil 
rights" of freedmen, he prompted no immediate action in 
Congress.n
14 Foner, Reconstruction. 523-24.
15 Ibid., 497-511.
16 Richardson, ed...Messages and Papers. VII, 255. 
ibid.
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But violence and disturbances within the South continued 
and demanded presidential action. Unrest in Arkansas 
elicited still another proclamation on May 15, 1874, but the 
political violence persisted.is indeed, it appeared in one 
state after another over the next three years as the southern 
"redeemers" seized control of the state governments.19
In Mississippi, for instance, Governor Adelbert Ames, a 
Republican, who with the support of black political leaders 
had solidly defeated incumbent Governor James L. Alcorn in 
1873, found his administration under paramilitary attack. On 
July 29, 1864, Ames telegraphed Grant for assistance. The 
governor informed the President that an "alarming condition 
of affairs" existed in the town of Vicksburg, Mississippi.
He claimed that unofficial "infantry and cavalry 
organizations exist[ed]," in the city, and he had received 
word that artillery pieces were en route. According to Ames, 
these units were "organized and armed without authority and 
in violation of law" and had proclaimed themselves "to be 
guardians of the peace." He argued that although this was 
clearly a "political situation" between Democrats,
"represented by the whites," and "Republicans, consisting 
mainly of blacks," he still deemed the intervention of 
federal troops necessary to "save many l i v e s . "20
Without direct guidance from Congress or any opportunity 
to issue yet another proclamation, Grant responded to Ames 
through the Secretary of War, William W. Belknap. On August
15 Ibid., 272-73.
19 Rable, But There Was No Peace. 163-85.
20 New York Times. August 1, 1874, p. 4.
1, 1874, the New York Times informed the nation that Belknap 
wired Ames on July 31, 1874, that the President had received 
the Governor's communication and had declined "to move the 
troops, except under a call made strictly in accordance with 
the terms of the Constitution. "21 Desiring to maintain his 
policy of peace and reunification, Grant elected not to send 
troops. He feared the violence and political repercussions 
that might result and believed that Ames had made no attempt 
to solve the crisis by using the powers available to him 
through the state government. But Grant's refusal to send 
troops did not pacify the troubled state. In the absence of 
federal troops, the conflict continued from August 1874 to 
January 1975 as Ames and his supporters held out against 
their more aggressive and violent opponents. In December 
1874 Grant issued yet another "Proclamation" and finally in 
January 1875 dispatched troops. His refusal of military aid 
in the name of peace had only helped to sustain the 
v i o l e n c e . 22 During this same period, Governor William P. 
Kellogg of Louisiana continued to confront rising violence 
and resistance to his administration. On August 30, 1874, 
according to Kellogg, six prominent Republican supporters who 
had surrendered to authorities "were set upon and 
deliberately murdered in cold blood," presumably by "members 
of the White League of Caddo P a r i s h . "23
21 ibid.
22 Rable, But There Was No Peace. 144-62.
23 New York Times, September 4, 1874, p. 1. For 
additional information see, Rable, But There Was No Peace. 
122-43.
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On September 2, 1874, Grant expressed his concern 
regarding "the recent atrocities in the South, particularly 
in Louisiana, Alabama, and South Carolina" and declared that 
they showed "a disregard for law, civil rights, and personal 
protection, that ought not to be tolerated in any civilized 
government." He went on to advise that it was "the duty of 
the Government to give all aid for the protection of life and 
civil rights legally authorized." Grant then directed the 
Secretary of War, General William H. Belknap, to consult with 
Attorney General George H. Williams and to send troops to 
"the localities where the greatest danger" existed.24
Later in September 1874, Grant issued another futile 
proclamation aimed at Louisiana and thereafter called upon 
the military to assist the recognized government of that 
state.25 under Grant’s orders, federal troops were sent to 
New Orleans and on September 18, General William H. Emory 
asked for and received the capitulation of the "State" forces 
in the city.26
In contrast to his previous actions, Grant was forced to 
defend the use of these federal troops against the 
recriminations of southern Democrats. In December 1874 Grant 
cited the Fifteenth Amendment as the authority for federal 
intervention. Any other interpretation of this amendment, he 
argued, left the "whole scheme of colored enfranchisement 
. . . worse than a mockery and little better than a crime."27
24 New York Times. September 4, 1874, p. 1.
25 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 277.
25 Rable, But There Was No Peace. 139-40.
27 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 297.
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Clearly, Grant found that his flexible plan of cooperation 
with Congress no longer worked. He had asked them to 
consider new legislation and none had been enacted; so, as 
promised, he had sought to enforce the current statutes.
Grant minimized the extent of federal intervention in 
this instance. This emphasis was consistent with the 
President's constitutional proclivities and the evolving 
national temper. He noted that only 4,082 federal troops 
were stationed in all of the garrisons between Delaware and 
the Gulf of Mexico. This was an insignificant number for an 
area encompassing fourteen states.28 Grant assured the nation 
that he understood that "the whole subject of Executive 
interference with the affairs of a State . . . [was] 
repugnant to public opinion" and that as President, it was 
his desire "that all necessity for Executive direction in 
local affairs . . . [would] become unnecessary and 
obsolete."29 Grant had not forgotten the nation's desire for 
peace, and he did not intend to make "Executive Intervention" 
a common practice.
Perhaps sensing that his flexible plan of congressional 
cooperation was no longer viable, Grant attempted to shift 
the responsibility for solving these matters from Congress to 
the American people themselves. He invited "the attention, 
not of Congress, but of the people of the United States, to 
the cause and effects of these unhappy questions" in the hope 
that they could help solve his and the nation's dilemma.
Grant believed that "if public opinion could be directed to a
28 ibid., 298.
29 ibid.
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correct survey" of events and "to rebuking wrong and aiding 
the proper authorities in punishing it," progress could be 
made. 30
Grant's attempt to shift the responsibility for 
maintaining peace to the American people themselves was an 
obvious effort to continue to use his flexible plan of 
seeking guidance from others and then acting upon it. These 
explanations and maneuvers did not satisfy Grant's critics, 
and yet another Louisiana incident forced Grant to defend his 
actions. On January 4, 1875, Federal troops under the 
command of Colonel Phillipe de Trobriand removed five 
Democrats, who claimed disputed seats, from the Louisiana 
State Assembly house. This apparent governmental 
intervention at the point of a bayonet outraged the 
President's critics.51
Therefore, in January 1875 he provided the Senate still 
another long report detailing political violence in 
Louisiana. Grant justified his decision for military 
intervention by arguing that "lawlessness, turbulence, and 
bloodshed" had "characterized the political affairs" of 
Louisiana since its return to the Union. As a result, "a 
shameful and undisguised conspiracy" had been organized in 
1872 "against the Republicans, without regard to law or 
right, and to that end the most glaring frauds and forgeries" 
had been committed.32 He then cited one atrocity after 
another, demonstrating the severe nature of the crisis. He
30 ibid., 299.
31 Foner, Reconstruction, 554-55.
32 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 305.
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documented specific examples of violence, such as when six 
men from Coushatta were "seized and carried away from their 
homes and murdered in cold blood. "33 According to Grant, this 
evidence demonstrated the necessity of maintaining a small 
garrison of federal troops in the area to provide Governor 
Kellogg with the means to enforce the law "and repress the 
continued violence which seemed inevitable the moment federal 
support should be withdrawn."34 such actions, Grant 
continued, had been essential to enforce the provisions of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.
Having acted on his own volition during the crisis,
Grant returned again to his flexible plan for working with 
Congress in the conclusion of this report. He reminded 
Congress that when he had first recognized the state 
government headed up by Governor Kellogg as the legitimate 
one in Louisiana he had called upon the legislators "to take 
action in the matter" if they did not agree with his 
decisions; otherwise he would "regard their silence as an 
acquiescence" in his program. Since they had taken no 
action, his subsequent course was justified. The President 
once more challenged Congress to take take "such action . . . 
as to leave . . . [his] duties perfectly clear in dealing 
with the affairs of Louisiana." He promised that whatever 
legislation they adopted would "be executed according to the 
spirit and letter of the law, without fear or f a v o r . "35 But 
the formula no longer applied. Congress once more failed to
33 ibid., 308.
34 ibid., 309.
35 ibid., 314.
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act; Grant's proclamation fell on deaf ears; and violence and 
fraud continued until in 1876 only the state governments of 
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida remained in Republican 
hands. And only the presence of federal troops kept these 
Republicans in office. In summary, Grant's flexible approach 
to dealing with Congress had failed to stop either the 
violence on a permanent basis or to save the Republican state 
governments in the majority of former Confederate states.
Why did Grant fail to alter his plan when it began to 
miscarry? Why did he not send troops into the South in 
sufficient numbers to terminate the violence and 
intimidation? First, it is unlikely that Grant could have 
sustained a decision to send extensive numbers of troops into 
the affected areas. Even the stationing of 4,082 troops in 
the entire South had drawn harsh criticism from his 
opponents. Increasing the number of men would have drawn 
even greater censorship, something Grant dearly wished to 
avoid. Also, from the end of the Civil War in 1865,
Congress, with Johnson's and Grant's blessing, had worked to 
reduce national spending and the deficit created by the war. 
One method of doing that had been to cut the military budget 
severely. As early as February 9, 1869, Representative James 
Garfield had declared proudly that "as the necessity of a 
military police in the late Rebel States diminished," the 
military had been allowed to decline until "the full strength
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of the army was 38,575 enlisted men, and a few less than 
3,000 commissioned o f f i c e r s . "36
This process continued throughout Grant's 
administration. By December 1870, an article in the New York 
Tribune questioned whether or not the United States could 
defend itself in case of a foreign war. The article declared 
that the United States had "no army except a small, scattered 
force, which could not be spared from its present duty," and 
the Army had "no breech-loading guns" with which "to arm new 
troops;" nor was there a "navy worth mentioning." The only 
solution was to "wisely conclude to keep the p e a c e . "37
Similar concerns surfaced during the crisis of September 
1874 in Louisiana. The New York Times reported that Army 
officers believed "that the army . . . [was] not large enough 
for the protection of the frontiers; and at the same time to 
act as a posse comitatus to judicial officers" in the 
southern states.38 clearly, to have mustered the troops 
necessary to confront insurgent groups in the South, Grant 
would have had to disregard the wishes of the American people 
for peace and a reduced Federal budget. Having promised to 
follow the desires of Congress and the people, Grant would 
not do this. Nor would his own character, fashioned in part 
by superstition, permit the reversal of his intended course 
regardless of the difficulties. Thus, extensive intervention 
was not a realistic option for Grant.
36 Burke A. Hinsdale, ed., The Works of James Abram 
Garfield. (2 vols., 1882; Reprint. Freeport, NY, 1970), I, 
410-11.
37 New York Tribune. December 6, 1870, p. 5.
38 New York Times. September 19, 1874, p. 1.
108
Second, he did not want to risk either open or guerrilla 
warfare within the South. All of Grant's actions since 1862, 
beginning with his victory at Fort Donelson, had been aimed 
at bringing peace to the nation. The surrender terms offered 
at Vicksburg and Appomattox had been designed to send the 
Confederate soldiers home and to leave them undisturbed. His 
actions as President through 1874 were designed to reduce 
conflict between the North and South. He believed that 
sending large numbers of troops to confront the insurgents, 
seizing their stores, arresting their leaders, and firing 
upon them would have regenerated the conflict. This Grant 
could not do. It was, he concluded, better to move forward 
following an unwritten plan that did not work in all areas 
than to forge a new one that risked all out conflict and 
racial war.39
Finally, Grant on at least one major occasion had 
already set out on his own and tried to convince both 
Congress and the nation to do something that he specifically 
recommended, the annexation of Santo Domingo. The background 
of the drive for acquiring the island was relatively simple. 
Like other expansionists, Grant became convinced that 
obtaining new territory would benefit the nation. He 
believed that this particular island would increase America's 
military and political power in the Caribbean. Commodore 
Daniel Ammen and Senator Cornelius Cole from California 
convinced him that Samana Bay, located on the northeastern 
shore of the island, would make a great U. S. naval base.
39 William S. McFeely, Grant; A Biography (New York, 
1982), 422.
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Peter J. Sullivan, William L. Cazneau and Joseph W. Fabens, 
three businessmen who stood to profit considerably, also 
helped persuade Grant of the plan's benefits. Finally, even 
the dictator of Santo Domingo, Buenaventura Baez, seemed 
interested in joining his island with the United States. As 
a result of their persuasion, Grant decided to annex the 
island with the Senate's ap p r o v a l .40
Having made that decision, Grant marshaled all of the 
forces available to him— his prestige, his supporters, and 
his limited persuasive skills— to convince the Senate and the 
nation that he was right. At first, it seemed that Grant 
would prevail. As early as July 17, 1869, the New York 
Tribune. still one of Grant's supporters, indicated in a 
headline article that "the annexation of the Island of San 
Domingo . . . [was] admitted to be merely a question of 
time. "4i
But as time passed the proposed treaty encountered 
increasingly stiff opposition for a variety of reasons.
Within the nation there were those who opposed the 
acquisition of lands overseas on general principles, while 
Radical Republicans rejected the idea of taking lands away 
from blacks for financial gain. Some whites opposed the 
treaty because they did not wish to expand the black 
population that already existed in the nation.42
40 Charles S. Campbell, The Transformation of American 
Foreign Relations. 1865-1900 (New York, 1976), 50-52. See 
also, Alan Nevins, Hamilton Fish; The Inner History of the 
Grant Administration (New York, 1936), 249-371.
41 New York Tribune, July 17, 1869, p. 1.
42 Campbell, American Foreign Relations. 52-53.
Grant's response to this opposition was typical; he only 
worked harder to insure passage of the annexation treaty. 
During the first week in January 1870, Grant visited Charles 
Sumner's home in the hope of obtaining his personal support 
for the treaty's passage. After a short and friendly 
discussion, Grant returned to the White House firmly 
convinced that Sumner had promised his help. But according 
to Sumner, no such assurance was given.43 in fact, Sumner, 
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
blocked the treaty’s path. As early as March 25, 1870, the 
New York Tribune noted Sumner's speech opposing annexation 
and concluded that the treaty would "not receive the 
requisite two-thirds of the Senate in ratification."44 Sumner 
argued against the treaty because he believed that annexation 
would be extremely costly to the United States, and that 
acquiring the island would only be the first step in 
acquiring other islands such as Haiti and the rest of the 
West Indies.45 He also pointed out that Santo Domingo was a 
land occupied by blacks and that it should remain so, rather 
than being annexed to an "Anglo Saxon" nation like the United 
States. In effect, Sumner argued the race issue in reverse; 
he contended that whites should not mix with the black race 
and deprive them of their island.46
43 Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man. 434-52.
44 New York Tribune. March 25, 1870, p. 4.
45 Beverly Wilson Palmer, ed., The Selected Papers of 
Charles Sumner (2 vols., Boston, 1990) II, 505.
46 Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man. 442-43.
In March 1870, a furious and determined Grant urged the 
Senate to ratify the treaty annexing Santo D o m in g o .47 Later 
in May, with no action forthcoming, Grant forwarded to 
Congress an addendum to the treaty authorizing an extension 
of the expiration date so that it could remain under 
consideration. Grant expressed "an unusual anxiety for the 
ratification of this treaty," because he believed it would 
"redound greatly to the glory of the two countries 
interested, to civilization, and to the expiration of the 
institution of slavery."48 He listed his justifications, 
which included the alleged desire of Santo Domingo to join 
the United States, to the rich resources of the country, to 
the fear that some other nation would annex the island. Of 
more importance to the process of Reconstruction, Grant 
implied that the area's resources, properly developed, would 
"give remunerative wages to tens of thousands of laborers not
now on the island. "49 Grant later explained in his
autobiography that he was referring to the persecuted black 
Americans of the South. Grant noted with some bitterness 
that he "took it that the colored people . . .  [of the United 
States] would go there in great numbers, so as to have 
independent states governed by their own race." He argued, 
after the fact, that they would still have been citizens of 
the United States and insured of its protection, but would 
have been able to avoid persecution in the South. The
47 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 52 -53.
48 ibid., 61.
49 Ibid., 62.
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settlement of this issue, declared Grant, had led him "to 
urge the annexation of Santo Domingo."so
The validity of such arguments is clearly debatable and 
Grant's opponents disagreed with him. More important than 
whether he was right or wrong was that Grant went out of his 
way to obtain the annexation of the island. He not only 
openly advocated a specific proposal, which contrasted with 
his earlier unwritten plan to avoid such conflict, but he 
also called upon Congress to follow his lead in this case and 
they refused.
On June 30, 1870, Grant lost the battle for annexation. 
Congress soundly rejected the treaty. The best that Grant 
and his supporters could accomplish was a dismal 28 to 28 tie 
in the Senate. But Grant refused to concede. He continued 
to apply notable pressure to the opposition, so much so that 
his chief opponent Charles Sumner found it very 
discomforting. In a letter to John Bigelow, dated August 7, 
1870, Sumner advised that Grant "had but one idea . . ., it 
was to annex St. Domingo" and that "Punishment & [sic] reward 
were equally employed."51
The President attempted unsuccessfully to revive the 
treaty the following year. Grant remained bitter over this 
defeat. In his final annual message of December 6, 1876, he 
broached the subject one last time and attempted to vindicate
himself by pointing out the error of the Senate’s actions.S2
5° E. B. Long, ed., Personal Memoirs Of U. S. Grant (New 
York, 1982), 588.
51 Palmer, Letters of Charles Sumner. II, 515.
52 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 413.
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The failure of the treaty clearly demonstrated that as early 
as June 1871 Grant was unable to adopt a position on a 
particular issue and then by argument and personal prestige 
convince Congress and the nation to follow his guidance.
Even though it is true that Grant was, as stated by historian 
Charles S. Campbell, "butting his head against a massive wall 
of opposition to southward expansion" and he "was out of 
touch with the traditional and still fervent opposition of 
his countrymen to overseas expansion," the critical point 
remains that the President with all of his power and prestige 
was not able to lead Congress where he wanted it to go in 
1870. How then could he have steered Congress into a program 
of intervention by federal marshals or the military that 
would have risked either heightened racial conflict or a 
renewal of the civil war itself? His only option was to 
maintain the most reasonable cooperative relationship between 
his office and Congress. Any other decision, considering the 
complexity of the Reconstruction issues and Grant's limited 
skills, might have generated a drive to impeach him, similar 
to the one aimed at Johnson in 1867-68.
Ultimately, neither Grant's flexible plan nor his 
declining popularity could sustain the weight of 
Reconstruction. As early as May 1875, under pressure from 
the press, the Democrats, and members of his own party, Grant 
addressed the issue of a "third" term in an open letter to 
the nation. Grant expressed regret that he was forced to 
address that topic before the "competent authority" of the 
political process rendered a decision. He informed the
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people that he did "not want" the nomination any more than in 
1868 and would accept only "if it were tendered . . . under 
such circumstances as to make it an imperative duty—  
circumstances not likely to arise."53 The Republican party 
and the American people took him at his word and nominated 
Rutherford B. Hayes as the GOP candidate.
The lame duck Grant did not give up on Reconstruction. 
Instead, in the final months of his term he attempted to 
insure an "honest canvass" at least in the remaining 
Republican strongholds in the South. When the election had 
been concluded and the outcome was challenged in the states 
of Louisiana, South Carolina, and Florida, Grant directed 
that the military in the disputed states "be vigilant with 
the force at their command to preserve peace and good order;" 
they were "to see that the people and the legal Boards of 
Canvassers . . . [were] unmolested in the performance of 
their duties."54 Grant's efforts did not change the final 
outcome of Reconstruction, the abandonment of the freedmen, 
but they demonstrated that he remained committed after others 
might have withdrawn.55
By January 1877 the South was firmly under the control 
of the redeemer governments, with the exception of the three 
southern states protected by federal troops. Then, on March 
5, 1877, as President Rutherford B. Hayes took office, the 
last remnants of Republican Reconstruction collapsed.
Although Hayes expressed great concern over the status of the
53 New York Tribune, May 31, 1875, p. 1.
54 New York Times. November 11, 1876, p. 1.
55 Rable, But There Was No Peace. 183.
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South and the conflicts which existed there, the new goal was 
"local self-government." According to Hayes, "the 
inestimable blessing of wise, honest, and peaceful local 
self-government" was "the imperative necessity required" by 
all parties.56 This return to "home rule" marked the final 
days of the Republican-supported governments in South 
Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, and guaranteed the 
dominance of the southern Democrats.57
The response to Hayes' message was just as warm and 
friendly as had been the response to Grant's, when he first 
took office. For instance, the New York Tribune, now freed 
from opposing Grant, declared that President Hayes' 
presentation would "give a fresh impulse to the revival of 
hope and cheerfulness throughout the country." As to his 
policy for solving the "Southern problem" the editorial 
declared that "the real South [would] take heart in hearing 
it, and honest Republicans at the North," would "hold their 
heads higher and rejoice in the dawn of a nobler d a y ."56
By July 18, 1877, the President of the United States no 
longer issued proclamations to order insurgent forces in the 
South to disperse and cease their activities. Instead,
Hayes' proclamations against insurrection dealt with domestic 
violence during the railroad strike of 1877 in Maryland and 
Pennsylvania. Then on December 3, 1877, in his first annual
56 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 443.
57 For additional information on President Hayes' 
administration see, H. Wayne Morgan, From Haves to McKinley; 
National Party Politics. 1877-1896 (Syracuse, 1969), 1-19 and 
Ari Hoogenboom, Rutherford B. Haves: Warrior and President
(Lawrence, 1995).
55 New York Tribune. March 6, 1877, p. 4.
message to the nation, Hayes defended the "discontinuance of 
the use of the Army for the purpose of upholding local 
governments in two States of the Union." According to him, 
this action was "a constitutional duty and requirement" that 
"was a much-needed measure for the restoration of local self- 
government and the promotion of national harmony." Hayes 
argued that "the withdrawal of the troops from such 
employment was effected deliberately, and with solicitous 
care for the peace and good order of society."59 Having 
gained the assurances of southern Democratic leaders that the 
civil rights of black Americans would be protected, he 
believed the withdrawal could be safely effected. He was 
wrong, and the benefits gained by the passage of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the Constitution were 
largely lost for eighty years or more.
59 Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers. VII, 459.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
It is upon this note of Northern capitulation to 
Southern forces, that the Reconstruction process commenced 
officially by President Lincoln on December 8, 1863, reached 
its conclusion in 1877. Four Presidents and the nation's 
Congress had wrestled with the issues growing out of the 
American Civil War and the destruction of the institution of 
slavery. Each group had attempted to bring peace and unity 
to the nation, with some success and many failures. The 
roles of three of the four presidents are clear.
President Lincoln had attempted to use Reconstruction as 
one more presidential measure to bring an end to the war and 
had offered liberal terms to entice the South to surrender. 
His plan drew opposition from Congress, and his assassination 
foreclosed the possibility of negotiating a workable 
agreement with Congress.
President Johnson elected to develop a plan of his own 
design. He differed from Lincoln in offering even more 
liberal terms to the white South, although his plan held 
little hope for the freedmen. When Congress challenged 
Johnson's leadership and passed opposing legislation, he 
fought back. By resisting Congress with bluntness and 
determination, he helped destroy any opportunity, however
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slight it may have been, for the nation to reconstruct itself 
between 1865 and 1867. Johnson's plans were rejected, and he 
was almost impeached.
President Hayes opted for withdrawal and an end to the 
conflict over Reconstruction. The retreat, which had clearly 
begun during Grant's presidency, was completed during Hayes' 
first year. This marked the end of Reconstruction.
But, what of Grant, "the tanner boy," and 
Reconstruction? His administration, which encompassed eight 
critical years of Reconstruction, is often obscured by the 
cloak and designation of "Congressional Reconstruction."
Yet, clearly Grant's decisions and actions had a significant 
impact on the process.
Although Grant's plan of action, unlike those of Lincoln 
and Johnson, was not specifically written down, it had just 
as much impact on Reconstruction as those of his 
predecessors. As Grant assumed the Presidency, he chose not 
to attempt to assert a leadership role in the development of 
Reconstruction legislation. He did not present for the 
people's consideration a plan of his own design; rather he 
relied on Congress to both plan and direct. Grant sought to 
reduce conflict within the nation by enforcing existing laws 
in a fair and equitable manner. He praised new laws, such as 
the Fifteenth Amendment, which he considered beneficial.
In enforcing these laws, Grant was very careful not to 
exceed the popular will. He did not insist on using the 
military to end incidents of rebellion in the South. Nor did 
he place armed guards on the polling booths to protect Union
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sympathizers or freedmen as they attempted to vote. Not even 
in the face of riots did he commit the armed forces for 
extended periods of time. Instead, he used the army only for 
brief interventions to resolve a particular emergency or to 
stabilize insecure state administrations. He employed the 
threat rather than the act of intervention to maintain 
limited order. In the final analysis, Grant did not wish to 
risk the fragile peace by possibly creating a guerrilla war 
in the South, and he understood that the people did not want 
additional conflict. By adopting this course, Grant hoped to 
maintain "peace" within the United States and to avoid the 
partisan warfare so common in the aftermath of a civil war.
This flexible plan, designed to reduce conflict between 
Congress and the presidency and within the nation, worked 
well during the first four years of Grant's administration. 
This was to Grant's credit and in turn was very beneficial to 
the nation. As a result of his actions, the severe conflict 
between Congress and Johnson and its threat to the office of 
the President was largely ended.
In addition, under Grant's unwritten plan, all of the 
remaining states had returned to their former constitutional 
relationship with the federal government by 1872. This was 
accomplished without further strife between the two branches 
of government. With the return of the Southern states, the 
nation could begin healing the emotional wounds of war. 
Secession had torn the nation apart in 1861 and made the 
Civil War all but inevitable. The reunification of the 
nation made further armed conflict between the North and
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South highly unlikely. Had this healing process been 
prevented by shutting the former Confederate states out of 
the Union, the risk of a renewed conflict would have been 
increased and the trials of Reconstruction worsened. But, 
with Grant's assistance, this unhappy circumstance was 
avoided and the nation was reunited into a single political 
entity.
Grant's procedure of recommending rather than demanding 
legislation helped smooth the passage of the important 
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution. He did not demand 
its passage, which might have served to generate increased 
Southern resistance out of an incorrect belief that the 
situation demanded obstruction rather than grudging 
acquiescence. Nor did he attempt to reshape it or resist it 
as Johnson had done, which might have delayed its passage. 
Instead, by quietly placing his prestige as the nation's most 
famous civil war general and as President behind its 
adoption, he helped expedite its passage. Although it would 
be almost a century before the amendment was fully enforced, 
Grant helped place it on the books.
In combating insurgent activities of the Klu Klux Klan, 
Grant's plan worked well again. He did not activate the 
militia to increase the power of Federal troops and employ 
them to control the situation. Instead, he issued 
proclamations of warning, calling for the groups to disperse 
and return to their homes. He recommended that Congress take 
the situation under consideration and suggested that it might 
pass any legislation deemed appropriate to deal with the
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crisis. In response, Congress gave him the new "Enforcement 
Acts," and armed with this legislation, he dealt with the 
Klan. By 1872, the power of the KKK was broken, and the 
insurgents were compelled to abandon that organization as an 
effective means of intimidation and terror.
These then were the beneficial results of Grant's 
Reconstruction policies. He clearly had helped reduce 
conflict between his office and Congress and between the 
North and the South, which had led the nation to war in 1861. 
He helped pass the Fifteenth Amendment, which would 
eventually be used to guarantee the rights of all citizens to 
vote, and helped break the power of the Ku Klux Klan.
But, as time passed, and the nation grew tired of the 
political and social issues raised by Reconstruction, Grant's 
flexible strategy faltered. The impact of an economic 
depression during his second administration turned the 
people's minds away from the "Southern" question and toward 
their own personal needs.
The return of the Democrats to Congress in large numbers 
from both the South, as the redeemer governments gained a 
foothold, and the North after the congressional elections of 
1874, reinforced this change of direction. Grant could no 
longer simply turn to Congress for the answer to some new 
problem and be assured of receiving new and improved 
legislation. With this altered composition, Congress was 
far less willing to comply with Grant's suggestions. This 
was the major flaw in his flexible approach. As long as 
Grant and Congress were of the same mind, Republican
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Reconstruction progressed, but when they differed, the course 
grew uncertain.
This uncertainty was particularly apparent when Southern 
insurgents continued their violent attacks on the Republican- 
backed State governments. Grant was unable to determine 
exactly what he needed to do when the guidance from Congress 
faltered. He intervened cautiously with federal troops on a 
piecemeal basis and attempted to walk the tightrope of 
maintaining peace while controlling the violence. In the 
end, he failed in this balancing act. Grant was not 
successful, as he had been with the Klan, in dealing with the 
activities of these new political insurgents, the southern 
Democrats and the white leagues. Although these groups did 
not wear disguises, their violent ways were just as deadly.
To make matters worse, portions of the nation and Congress 
actively condemned his actions as tyranny, and others failed 
to speak out on his behalf. His own reluctance to meet 
violence with violence, born out of his experiences in the 
Civil War, prevented him from calling out the limited troops 
available for determined use in quelling the violent 
insurrections.
Finally, Grant's own beliefs and plan precluded using 
the only remaining alternatives left after his cooperative 
relationship with Congress failed. Other Presidents might 
have attempted to seize control and assume overall leadership 
by demanding action or utilizing, as had Lincoln, the powers 
of the presidency to intervene directly on a significant 
scale. Still others might have turned their backs and given
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in altogether, refusing to deal with the issues at hand and 
letting events take their own course. But Grant had already 
rejected these alternatives in his first administration. He 
had adopted a cooperative approach to government, had taken a 
stand to support the Reconstruction policies of the 
government, and had worked to aid the freedmen. Moreover, 
his own personal commitment not to waver from a chosen course 
of action insured that he could not scrap the old plan and 
adopt a new one in the final years of his presidency.
It is also highly unlikely that Grant, with his limited 
political background, could have seized the initiative. His 
willingness to support and failure to gain acceptance of the 
Santo Domingo treaty demonstrated his limited political 
capacity. Grant simply was not the man to commandeer the 
legislative process and lead the nation where he wanted it to 
go. In summarizing his presidency, his faithful supporter, 
the New York Times, noted that in the end "it was the 
misfortune of Gen. Grant that with one step he passed from 
the command of the Army to the direction of the affairs of 
State" and that "the habits of thought which worked smoothly 
in one sphere were unsuited to the other." The newspaper 
concluded that Grant as "the leader of a victorious army 
found himself at the mercy of pretentious politicians who 
abused his confidence and made him the scapegoat for their 
sins."i
But, to Grant's credit, he never abandoned the battle, 
as did President Hayes, by withdrawing troops from the last
i New York Tribune. March 4, 1877, p. 6.
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two states. Instead, he continued to seek to enforce the law 
of the land and to guarantee the right of both white and 
black Americans to vote. He intervened, however moderately, 
to aid the Republican Unionists and the black Americans in 
the South. Also, he successfully avoided the development of 
outright partisan warfare in the South, and he maintained at 
least a limited peace.
In addition, Grant never quit trying to assist the 
freedmen and protect them from their enemies in the South. 
Throughout his administration Grant offered his support to 
those legislative proposals which called for aid to black 
Americans. He supported the Fifteenth Amendment which 
promised African-Americans suffrage. He advocated patience 
and understanding for the freedmen and called on the American 
people to extend them an equal opportunity in the areas of 
education, suffrage, and their legal rights. He signed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 into law, and he sought to support 
Republican state governments that resisted the redeemer's 
counterrevolutions in Mississippi and Louisiana. Even the 
New York Tribune. an outspoken critic of Grant's final four 
years, acknowledged that "it was certainly a merciful 
Providence for the freeman that he found at that critical 
time a President" who was so willing to adopt such "a liberal 
view of the power and duty of the Executive in extending over 
him the protecting shield of the Union."2 Grant truly tried 
to help the former slaves, but all of his support and actions 
did not insure their social, civil, and political rights
2 New York Tribune. March 3, 1877, p. 6.
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including suffrage in the face of the redeemers' resistance. 
That he did not succeed in many of his endeavors should not 
erase the evidence that he did try to and did delay the final 
collapse of Reconstruction.
In summary, the final results of Grant's Reconstruction 
policies were mixed. He did help reunite the nation, pass 
the Fifteenth Amendment and break the power of the Klan in 
1872. He also refused to abandon the Republican-based state 
governments or the freedmen in the former rebel states. He 
did not, however, make the Reconstruction process in the 
South work, and he was unable to stop either the violence or 
the resurgence of the redeemer-controlled governments. Nor 
did he enable black Americans to retain their full rights as 
American citizens under the law. Both the successes and 
failures resulted to an extent from the unwritten plan by 
which he acted as President. While it may well be said that 
the years between 1867 and 1877 were ones of "Congressional" 
Reconstruction, it must also be said that President Grant had 
a definite hand in what occurred. And considering his 
limited social and political background and the overwhelming 
complexity of the issues addressed in Reconstruction, Grant 
did take a position and held it until the opposition became 
overwhelming and his allies abandoned the field before him.
For in the end, it was Grant who assured that Congressional 
legislation was enforced to the best of his ability long 
after others had lost interest in the process.
Reconstruction's successes and failures must be ascribed to
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Grant and Congress, the partners who failed to meet all of 
their obligations to all of the people.
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